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ABSTRACT 
A persistent American confusion regarding the proper relationship 
between law and morality is manifest in the opinions in Lawrence v. Texas.1 
The Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom provides 
the foundation for an analytical framework that can bring clarity to that 
confusion. The heart of this framework is the moral concept of public order. 
This concept offers a principled explanation of both the holding in 
Lawrence and the limitations the Court placed on that holding. The Court 
could clarify the confusion manifest in Lawrence by explicitly 
acknowledging that a state interest only becomes legitimate for purposes of 
rational basis review when the asserted interest constitutes a public order 
concern. A constitutional jurisprudence that aspires to be faithful to the sort 
of limited government that is demanded by respect for human dignity 
should recognize that the state can only use law to restrain human freedom 
when that limitation serves a public order function. 
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[T]he Declaration [on Religious Freedom] adopts the concept of public 
order. The concept has good warrant in constitutional law. However, it is 
more frequently used than defined. The Declaration undertakes to define it. 
In doing so, it makes a contribution to the science of law and 
jurisprudence.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he American mind has never been clear about the relation between 
morals and law.”3 This persistent lack of clarity is an urgent problem at a 
time when the American political and legal landscape teems with issues 
raising questions about the proper relationship between law and morality. 
Banning partial-birth abortion, prohibitions of physician-assisted suicide, 
proposals both to limit and to promote embryonic stem-cell research, 
efforts to preserve marriage for opposite-sex couples, control of Internet 
pornography and gambling; all of these are issues that we easily 
characterize as raising the question of whether it is appropriate to use the 
law to enforce contested moral norms. At the same time, we should also 
recognize that the protection of civil rights, the use of affirmative action, 
the regulation of immigration, the death penalty, the procedures governing 
military tribunals and detainee interrogations, and the propriety of the 
estate tax are all properly understood as issues that call us to think about 
the proper relationship between law and morality as well.4 
Indeed, moral judgments “are inextricably bound up in our lawmaking 
and, as a result, [they are] inevitably present in our adjudication.”5 
Profound moral judgments, for example, are involved simply in trying to 
decide what sorts of activities or conduct constitute harms to society that 
are properly addressed by legislators and courts.6 This inextricable 
                                                                                                                                      
2 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Commentary and Notes on the Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE 
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 672, 686 n.20 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed., 1966) [hereinafter Notes on the 
Declaration].  
3 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 156 (1960). 
4 See, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189–90 (2005) (invidious discrimination is illegal because it is “conduct deemed 
unjust and immoral by contemporary American law.”)(“[I]f we defend Title VII as it should be 
defended, in the language of equality and justice, then we are defending it on the basis of a moral 
judgment.”); id. at 189 (“[T]here has never been any general prohibition in American constitutional 
jurisprudence against laws based on morality. Our entire legal system would probably be 
unconstitutional if there were.”). 
5 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1304 (2004). Goldberg’s article “aims to reinforce the urgent need to 
facilitate meaningful review of majoritarian invocations of morality without demanding the complete 
eradication of morals-based interests from lawmaking.” Id. at 1301. She proposes a fact-based rationale 
requirement as “one potential approach to resolving this tension.” Id. Her approach would limit 
governments to “adopting laws and policies that can be justified by reference to observable or otherwise 
demonstrable harms.” Id. at 1305. This Article proposes an alternative approach for evaluating the use 
of morals-based interests in lawmaking and adjudication.  
6 Id. at 1302; see also id. at 1301 (“[N]ormative judgments about individual and social well-being 
underlie” many legal arguments.); id. at 1301 n.281 (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A 
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981) for the argument that “liberalism’s support for government neutrality 
among diverse aims does not represent a non-neutral position”); see also M. Cathleen Kaveny, 
Autonomy, Solidarity and Law’s Pedagogy, 27 LOUVAIN STUDIES 339, 341 (2002) (“Always and 
everywhere, law teaches a moral lesson—it imbues a vision of how the members of a particular society 
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interrelationship between law and morality is, in part, reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s frequent acknowledgment that morality is a subject within 
the traditional scope of legitimate legislative power.7 Yet, when the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas8 struck down a Texas statute 
criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct, the Court “rejected explicitly a 
morality-based justification for [the] law on the ground that it lacked 
legitimacy.”9 Thus, American constitutional law must confront a serious 
question: in the wake of Lawrence, how are we to distinguish those moral 
justifications that provide a legitimate basis for lawmaking from those that 
do not? The Supreme Court in Lawrence failed to provide an explicit 
answer to that question. 
The opinions produced by the Justices of the Supreme Court in 
Lawrence provide compelling evidence that the persistent American 
confusion about the proper relationship between law and morality has now 
borne fruit in doctrinal incoherence. This Article argues that resources 
                                                                                                                                      
should live their lives together. We need to find a way, first, to acknowledge the fact that law teaches, 
and second, to take responsibility for what it teaches.”).  
7 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and 
quiet, law and order— these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application 
of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not 
delimit it.”); RUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 189 (“The official American understanding has always been 
that legislators have the prerogative, or even the duty, to protect the ‘health, safety, and morals’ of their 
constituents.”); see also MURRAY, supra note 3, at 159 (“[E]very government has always claimed what 
is called police power, as an attribute of government. This power in itself is simply the principle of self-
preservation and self-protection transferred to the body politic. It extends to the requirements of public 
morals, public health, public safety, public order, and the general comfort of society. The only question 
is, how far and in what circumstances does it extend to all these social values?”).  
Suzanne Goldberg notes that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has not sought to define morality even in its 
most enthusiastic celebrations of the morals-based police power.” Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1241. 
Goldberg goes on to explain that “the Court tends to invoke morality to refer to a systematic way of 
thinking about right and wrong forms of conduct, consistent with the term’s dictionary definition.” 
Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1241–42 & n.25 (noting that the American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language defines “morality as [a] system of ideas of right and wrong conduct”). Goldberg also 
cites a range of more refined scholarly efforts to define morality, which, in her view, “illustrate the 
challenges of even defining morality, let alone relying on it as a justification for government action.” 
Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1242 n.26. At the same time, however, Goldberg recognizes that moral 
judgment is pervasive in law. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1302. This Article uses the term “morality” to 
refer to reflection concerned with the question of how human beings ought to live, individually and in 
community, if they are to flourish. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAW 11 (1988); 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE & POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 76 
(1991) [hereinafter PERRY, LOVE & POWER] (moral beliefs are “beliefs about how it is good or fitting 
for human beings to live their lives”); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious 
Ground?, 54 EMORY L. J. 97, 120 (2005) [hereinafter Perry, The Morality of Human Rights] (describing 
the following questions as “fundamental moral inquir[ies]: What states of affairs are good–truly good–
for human beings . . . what states of affairs are bad for them? What states of affairs are friendly to or 
even constitutive of authentic human well being (eudaimonia), and what states are hostile to or even 
destructive of it?”). While much contemporary moral philosophy gives a narrower focus to the concept 
of morality, this Article adopts the position proposed by Michael Perry: political thinking from which 
disputed beliefs about the human good are excluded is “impossibly restrictive. Such a politics is bereft 
of the normative resources required for addressing, much less resolving, the most fundamental political-
moral issues that engage and divide us . . . [including a question that] is indisputably and appropriately 
at the very heart of domestic and international politics: Are there human rights and, if so, what are 
they?” PERRY, LOVE & POWER, at 29; see also id. at 181 n.45 (discussing philosopher Charles Taylor’s 
views on the “ ‘cramped and truncated view of morality in a narrow sense’ ” adopted by “ ‘[m]uch 
contemporary moral philosophy’ ”) (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING 
OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 3 (1989)). 
8 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
9 Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1243. 
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drawn from the tradition of Catholic social thought and articulated in the 
Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom10 can rectify 
that incoherence by generating an analytical framework for understanding 
the relationship between law and morality. The heart of this framework is 
the moral concept of public order. After providing a comprehensive 
overview of those resources, the Article uses them in the context of 
Lawrence to illustrate the significant contribution those resources can make 
to contemporary U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.  
The Texas statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized private, adult, 
consensual same-sex sexual activity. Texas argued that the legitimate 
governmental interest of promoting morality provided a valid constitutional 
basis for the law.11 The Court rejected this argument, and asserted that a 
governing majority’s belief that this activity is immoral fails to provide a 
sufficient reason to uphold a law prohibiting the activity.12 Justice 
O’Connor, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, similarly argued that 
the Constitution prohibits “[a] law branding one class of persons as 
criminal based solely on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and the 
conduct associated with that class.”13 At the same time, both the Court and 
Justice O’Connor sought to draw a distinction between laws that are 
unconstitutional because they are based simply on moral disapproval of 
homosexual conduct and laws protecting the traditional institution of 
marriage.14 
Justice Scalia in dissent mocked the Court and Justice O’Connor’s 
efforts to draw such a distinction. He maintained that the Texas statute 
should be upheld on the basis of the “ancient proposition” holding “that a 
governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and 
unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”15 Justice Scalia 
fears that, in the course of rejecting this “ancient proposition,” the Court 
has “appl[ied] an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have 
far reaching implications beyond this case,”16 effectively decreed an end to 
                                                                                                                                      
10 The Second Vatican Council was an authoritative gathering of Catholic bishops from all over the 
world that took place between 1962 and 1965. The Council was convened in order to promote the 
spiritual renewal of the church and to consider the relationship of the church to the contemporary world. 
The Declaration on Religious Freedom was promulgated in 1965 as the Council was drawing to a close. 
The Declaration’s common Latin title—Dignitatis Humanae—is taken from the opening words of 
the document’s Latin text: “A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself 
more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man.” Declaration on Religious Freedom, 
in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675, supra note 2 [hereinafter Declaration]. 
11 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582.  
12 Id. at 577. 
13 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
14 Id. at 578 (majority opinion) (noting that Lawrence “does not involve whether the government must 
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”); id. at 585 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such 
as . . . preserving the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex 
relations⎯the asserted state interest in this case⎯other reasons exist to promote the institution of 
marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”).  
15 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 586. Some have suggested that Lawrence is more convincingly read as a fundamental rights 
case applying a form of heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
”Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). But cf. Calvin 
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 959–60 (2004) 
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all legislation on morals,17 provided the doctrinal foundation for “a massive 
disruption of the social order,”18 and left on “pretty shaky grounds state 
laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”19 For Justice Scalia, the 
logical implications of the holding in Lawrence are clear. He characterized 
the Court’s effort to distinguish a law criminalizing consensual same-sex 
sexual activity from legal recognition of same-sex unions as a “bald, 
unreasoned disclaimer”20 that should not be believed, “This case ‘does not 
involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief 
that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. 
Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so.”21 
Thus, the Court and Justice O’Connor seem to seek to exclude moral 
disapproval entirely from the range of legitimate purposes that law might 
promote,22 while Justice Scalia appears to accept all majoritarian moral 
disapproval as a presumptively legitimate basis for legal coercion. Each of 
these opinions is rooted in different, but equally confused, understandings 
of the relationship between law and morality. A more nuanced 
understanding of that relationship23 ought to govern how we think about 
what constitutes a legitimate basis for legal coercion, both in constitutional 
adjudication and in public policy deliberation in a limited, constitutional 
government. 
                                                                                                                                      
(“To be sure, there are textual morsels in the Court’s opinion in Lawrence that hint that there is 
something more than minimal scrutiny at work in its decision. . . . When taken out of the context of the 
entire opinion, one would think these passages declarative of a fundamental liberty interest, the trigger 
for strict scrutiny under conventional substantive due process analysis. Yet . . . Justice Kennedy 
punctures this balloon by stating that the Texas law ‘furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.’ ”) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 578); see also Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005) (Lawrence did not announce a 
fundamental right for adults to engage in all forms of consensual sexual conduct); Williams v. Att’y 
Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its 
dicta a right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny. To do so would be to impose a fundamental 
rights interpretation that rested on rational-basis grounds, that never engaged in Glucksberg analysis, 
and that never invoked strict scrutiny.”), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. King, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); 
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 979 (Wash. 2006) (“The [Lawrence] Court did not apply strict 
scrutiny as would be expected if a fundamental right were at stake.”).  
17 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 591. 
19 Id. at 601. 
20 Id. at 604. 
21 Id. at 605. 
22 Some scholars have suggested that the Court has put an end to morals-based justifications for law. 
See, e.g., Keith Burgess-Jackson, Our Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Repudiation of 
Immorality as a Ground of Criminal Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 407, 415 
(2004) (“Thus ends legal moralism as a constitutional principle. In effect, Justice Kennedy and his 
colleagues in the majority read the United States Constitution as rejecting legal moralism and 
embracing, or at least moving toward, Millian liberalism.”); Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our 
Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional 
Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (2004). But see Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 
1224, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (holding that “public morality” provides a rational basis for an Alabama 
statute prohibiting the commercial distribution of sexual devices) (“[T]his court’s holding illustrates that 
Justice Scalia’s ominous prediction – that the majority’s opinion in Lawrence ‘effectively decrees the 
end of all morals legislation’ – will not be realized.”).  
23 Cf. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Law, Morality and Common Ground, 183 AMERICA, Dec. 9, 2000, at 8 (“If 
we are to find common ground on complicated issues of law and morality, we need to begin by refusing 
to oversimplify their relationship. In this regard, the Roman Catholic jurisprudential tradition has a 
great deal to contribute to the contemporary public conversation . . . [I]t provides a remarkably 
sophisticated and powerful way of analyzing the interaction between legal and moral concerns . . . .”). 
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This Article will argue that the analytical framework generated by the 
Declaration can clarify the confusion manifest in the Lawrence opinions. 
By rejecting the long-held position that “error has no rights”24 and 
solemnly affirming a fundamental human right to religious freedom, the 
Declaration stands as “a tacit recognition” that the church had in fact 
learned something through its often tumultuous encounters with the 
Western liberal tradition during the previous two centuries.25 Through those 
encounters, the church’s doctrine regarding religious freedom developed; 
the encounters with the liberal tradition prompted a process of learning that 
led the church to a “richer and more explicit . . . view of the dignity of the 
human person and of the rights intrinsic to” that dignity.26 Indeed, the 
Declaration might well be remembered for the sober witness that it 
provides to the church’s humble recognition of its need to learn before it 
can effectively exercise its critical mission of teaching.27  
This Article contends that an analogous opportunity for learning and 
development in American constitutional jurisprudence might emerge from 
an encounter between American constitutional law and central elements of 
the tradition of Catholic social thought that are manifest in the Declaration. 
The Declaration deserves the attention of constitutional lawyers because of 
what it can teach us about the nature of constitutional government: 
government whose legitimate scope and power are limited by the demand 
for responsible freedom rooted in human dignity. The Declaration’s 
                                                                                                                                      
24 See Leslie Griffin, Commentary on Dignitatis Humanae, in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: 
COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 244, 254 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. ed., 2005); see also infra 
note 49. 
25 HERMINIO RICO, S.J., JOHN PAUL II AND THE LEGACY OF DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 8 (2002). 
26 Id. As Rico explains, in the Declaration the church “came around to adopt an institutional 
development that it had not promoted, and which it had strongly resisted for a long time. In 
considerable measure, the church was led by others to the acceptance of values and institutions very 
much in conformity with the Christian view of the person and of society, but to which the church had 
been blinded . . . .” Id.; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE 
145–58 (2005); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 329–53 (1998). For a discussion of the idea of doctrinal development in both 
theology and constitutional law, see Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J, Christian Scripture and American 
Scripture: An Instructive Analogy? 21 J.L. & REL. 101, 121–33 (2005–2006). 
27 John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in VATICAN II: AN INTERFAITH 
APPRAISAL 565, 566 (John H. Miller ed., 1966) (The Declaration “was a major act of humility on the 
part of the teaching Church.”). See also John Courtney Murray, S.J., Introduction to Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 2, at 672, 673 (“It can hardly be 
maintained that the Declaration is a milestone in human history – moral, political, or intellectual. The 
principle of religious freedom has long been recognized in constitutional law . . . . In all honesty it must 
be admitted that the Church is late in acknowledging the validity of the principle.”); cf. Joseph Cardinal 
Bernadin, The Consistent Ethic of Life after Webster, in A MORAL VISION FOR AMERICA 79, 92 (John P. 
Langan S.J., ed., 1998) (“The [church’s teaching] style should be persuasive, not preachy. . . . We 
should be convinced we have much to learn from the world and much to teach it.”); The Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, 
supra note 2, at 199, 246 (“With the help of the Holy Spirit, it is the task of the entire People of God, 
especially pastors and theologians, to hear, distinguish, and interpret the many voices of our age, and to 
judge them in the light of the divine Word. In this way, revealed truth can always be more deeply 
penetrated, better understood, and set forth to greater advantage.”) (emphasis added); DAVID 
HOLLENBACH, S.J., THE GLOBAL FACE OF PUBLIC FAITH: POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS 31 (2003) (“It was [John Courtney] Murray’s genius to have discovered intellectually 
compelling arguments that could incorporate the insights contained within both traditions [i.e., 
Catholicism and liberalism] and to do so on terms that could enable both Catholicism and liberalism to 
hold their valid insights while learning from each other.”). 
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understanding of limited, constitutional government provides us with a 
crucial framework for exploring the relationship between human dignity, 
freedom, morality, and the proper function and limits of law in the 
contemporary American constitutional order. It is here that the Declaration 
might continue to make “a contribution to the science of law and 
jurisprudence”28 forty years after its promulgation. 
The urgent need for such a framework in American constitutional law 
is evident in the strikingly different approaches to the question of the 
proper relationship between law and morality articulated by the Justices in 
Lawrence. Justice Kennedy for the Court, Justice O’Connor concurring in 
the judgment, and Justice Scalia in dissent each staked out competing 
positions regarding the manner in which the relationship between law and 
morality ought to influence constitutional analysis. This Article argues that 
the approach to the question of the proper relationship between law and 
morality suggested by the Declaration provides a more coherent 
understanding of that relationship than any of the approaches articulated by 
the Justices in Lawrence. The analytical framework generated by the 
Declaration allows us to see that there are moral limits on morals 
legislation—indeed, there are moral limits on the state’s use of law, 
whether the action is characterized as morals legislation or not.29 At the 
same time, while the sort of morals law invalidated in Lawrence is properly 
seen as going beyond the state’s legitimate authority to act through coercive 
law,30 explicit reliance on moral rationales for law should not be banished 
altogether from the realm of legitimate government interests. 
Part II of this Article will describe the analytical framework established 
by the Declaration, with a particular focus on the moral concept of public 
order as a limit on the legitimate sphere of governmental action, the 
distinction between private morality and public morality, and the way in 
which the public morality component of public order provides a legitimate 
basis for governmental action through law. This Part will conclude by 
articulating a framework of six central principles drawn from the 
Declaration that illuminate a nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between law and morality. Part III of the Article will then bring the 
                                                                                                                                      
28 Notes on the Declaration, supra note 2, at 686 n.20. 
29 For a theological argument drawing more explicitly on Scripture to reach a similar conclusion, see 
David Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, U. PA. J. CONST. L.: 
 
Conflating God’s law and man’s law . . . does violence to both. It makes far too much of 
man’s law and far too little of God’s. Which leads to surprising implications about 
contemporary American politics: The deep divide between moralists and libertarians may be 
needless, the result more of theological error than of spiritual disagreement. Libertarians 
seek to minimize formal legal restraints on private conduct. That agenda should hold some 
appeal for wise moralists, at least if the moralists are Christian. After all, the rule of law is a 
moral good in Christian terms. And the law is likely to be honored best where legal restraints 
are most modest. The rule of good morals, meanwhile, must be honored – if it is to be 
honored at all – in the hearts and minds of the citizenry. Not in its courthouses. 
 
Id. at 839. 
30 As will become clear through the course of the argument in Part II, to state that the Court reached the 
proper result in Lawrence is not to take any position with respect to the morality or immorality of same-
sex sexual activity. See infra text accompanying notes 42 & 51–58.  
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clarifying potential of the moral concept of public order to bear on the 
confusion manifest in the opinions issued in Lawrence. Finally, Part IV will 
argue that understanding the public order concept as a moral limit on 
legitimate state action will avoid the problem of massive social disruption 
that Justice Scalia (perhaps hyperbolically) fears. 
My hope is to demonstrate that the analytical framework established by 
the Council’s Declaration will allow us to see the Court’s result in 
Lawrence as a proper and coherent exercise of rational basis review.31 By 
helping us to explain the Court’s action in Lawrence as something other 
than covert or implicit fundamental rights adjudication, the Declaration’s 
framework may, in fact, cut the “Gordian knot” presented by Lawrence.32 
The moral concept of public order as a limit on the legitimate reach of law 
enhances our understanding of what constitutes a legitimate governmental 
interest under the rational basis test and allows us to see why a law 
criminalizing private, adult, consensual sexual activity within the context of 
a relationship is properly held to be beyond the state’s police power, while 
other sorts of regulations often understood as morals-based legislation 
should withstand constitutional challenge, at least when the challenged law 
is properly subject to review under the rational basis test.33 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF LAW 
The doctrinal core of the Declaration consists of its affirmation of a 
right to religious freedom that “has its foundation in the very dignity of the 
human person.”34 The Council insists that this natural human right must be 
                                                                                                                                      
31 My argument in this Article is limited to demonstrating that the Declaration can help us to understand 
what constitutes a legitimate state interest for purposes of rational basis review. It is not my intention 
here to argue that the public order concept as articulated in the Declaration provides adequate 
constitutional protection for the right of religious freedom, especially when religious exercise is 
constrained by the regulatory actions of the contemporary administrative state. For example, it is 
possible to imagine laws supported by a public order rationale that impose arguably undue restraints on 
the exercise of religious freedom by individuals, see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
(holding there is no free exercise violation in penalizing sacramental use of peyote, where state law 
prohibits possession of peyote as a controlled substance), and institutions, see Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) (holding religion clauses of federal and state 
constitutions did not prohibit state from mandating that a church-affiliated employer provide insurance 
coverage for prescription contraceptives, even though use of contraceptives violated church teaching), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).  
32 Massey, supra note 16, at 995; see also Massey, supra note 16, at 990 (“Lawrence makes a shambles 
of the search for nontextual liberties by trivializing the difference between fundamental and 
nonfundamental liberties.”).  
33 Because the public order limitation is a general moral limit on the state’s use of law, it would also 
apply to legislation reviewed under various forms of heightened scrutiny. Discussion of the relationship 
of the public order concept to constitutional adjudication in cases involving fundamental rights or 
protected classes is beyond the scope of this Article, but it would follow from the argument presented 
here that an important public order interest (in the case of intermediate scrutiny) or a compelling public 
order interest (in the case of strict scrutiny) would be demanded if the challenged governmental action 
were to be upheld. Cf. Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the 
Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 637–38 (2003) (discussing the question of when, and to what 
degree, courts appropriately defer to the politically accountable branches and when it is appropriate in a 
democracy for courts to have “the power to oppose, in the name of one or more entrenched human 
rights norms, choices made by, or actions of, electorally accountable government officials”).  
34 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679. 
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“recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed.”35 
Protected in this way as a civil right, the right to religious freedom 
articulated by the Council consists of two-fold immunity from coercion in 
religious matters: no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to their 
own beliefs, and no one is to be restrained from acting in accordance with 
their own beliefs, “whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in 
association with others, within due limits.”36 
A. HUMAN DIGNITY AND RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM 
The nature of the human right to religious freedom as an immunity 
from coercion, and the Declaration’s understanding of what sorts of 
restraints on conduct flowing from religious beliefs are “due,” both flow 
from the understanding of human dignity developed in the Declaration. 
The Declaration opens by acknowledging that “[a] sense of the dignity of 
the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the 
consciousness of contemporary man.”37 This increased consciousness 
makes itself manifest in two demands that the Council declares “to be 
greatly in accord with truth and justice.”38 The first is a demand for 
responsible freedom—the ability to act on one’s own judgment, “not driven 
by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty.” The second is a demand for 
freedom in human society—a demand “that constitutional limits should be 
set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no 
encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations.”39 
Thus, in declaring a right to religious freedom, the Council is really 
affirming “a principle of wider import – that the dignity of man consists in 
his responsible use of freedom.”40 
The Declaration also clearly acknowledges that respect for the dignity 
of the human person in no way depends on whether or not the person’s 
beliefs or actions are in accord with religious or moral truth. By means of 
this acknowledgement, the Council departed from the older understanding 
that “error has no rights.”41 The Council thus rejected the notion that only 
the conscience that had apprehended the objective truth was worthy of 
freedom and immunity from coercion. At the same time, this development 
in church teaching regarding the relationship between truth and freedom 
must not be understood as approval of any efforts to sever the connection 
between truth and freedom. Instead, the Council insisted that the exercise 
of responsible freedom is, indeed, oriented toward the truth: as beings 
endowed with reason and free will, “all men should be at once impelled by 
                                                                                                                                      
35 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679.  
36 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679 (emphasis added). 
37 Declaration, supra note 10, at 675. 
38 Declaration, supra note 10, at 676. 
39 Declaration, supra note 10, at 675. Cf. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, July 10, 
2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract=916336 (arguing that the freedom of the church as an institution is a 
crucial component of religious freedom).  
40 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Introduction to Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS 
OF VATICAN II, supra note 2, at 672, 674. 
41 See Griffin, supra note 24, at 251, 254. 
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nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially 
religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, 
and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.”42  
It is, in fact, the affirmation of this duty to seek and follow the truth 
that helps to ground the Declaration’s articulation of a right to a responsible 
freedom immune from coercion. In order to carry out the obligation to seek 
and adhere to the truth in a way that accords with human dignity, the 
person must have both “psychological freedom” and freedom from 
“external coercion.”43 If the search for truth is to proceed in a manner 
proper to the dignity of human nature, that search must move toward a 
personal appropriation of the truth, rather than the acceptance of an 
externally imposed truth. In the search for truth, each person has the duty, 
and therefore the right, “[to] form for himself right and true judgments of 
conscience, with the use of all suitable means. . . . [A]s the truth is 
discovered, it is by personal assent that men are to adhere to it.”44 
Moreover, once one comes to know the truth, one has a right to act in ways 
that are faithful to the truth:  
 
In all his activity [i.e., not just in his religious activity] a [person] is bound 
to follow his conscience faithfully . . . . It follows that he is not to be 
forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other 
hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, 
especially in matters religious.45 
 
Indeed, injury is done to both the human person and the moral order “if the 
free exercise of religion is denied in society when the just requirements of 
public order do not so require.”46 
Because this imperative of human nature to search for truth in a manner 
that accords with human dignity gives rise to the right to religious freedom, 
the possession and exercise of that right cannot be dependent on “the 
subjective disposition of the person.”47 In other words, the right to 
immunity from coercion is not dependent on whether or not one has 
actually apprehended the truth. “In consequence, the right to this immunity 
continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of 
seeking the truth and adhering to it.”48 Instead, the right to religious 
freedom, and by implication, the more general right to seek the truth and 
act on it of which the right to religious freedom is a privileged component, 
is not to be impeded so long as “the just requirements of public order are 
observed.”49 The dignity of the human person is injured if one’s exercise of 
                                                                                                                                      
42 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679. 
43 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679. 
44 Declaration, supra note 10, at 680–81 (emphasis added). 
45 Declaration, supra note 10, at 681 (emphasis added). 
46 Declaration, supra note 10, at 681. 
47 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679.  
48 Declaration, supra note 10, at 679. 
49 Declaration, supra note 10, at 680. Herminio Rico argues that these affirmations of section two of the 
Declaration state the “novelty brought about by Dignitatis Humanae.” By “definitively steering [the 
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responsible freedom is restrained when the just demands of public order do 
not require the restraint. 
Drawing on this central affirmation of the Declaration, Pietro Pavan, a 
key theological advisor at the Council who was involved in drafting the 
text, insisted that the human dignity affirmed in the Declaration, a dignity 
shared by all human persons simply by virtue of their humanity, must be 
understood as an existential or ontological dignity, not a dignity founded in 
morally upright behavior.50 For Pavan, the Declaration 
 
is concerned not with the moral dignity that belongs to a person because 
of the uprightness of his or conscience, but with the very nature of person. 
This dignity is grounded on the human reality which the person is, that is, 
on elements rooted in his or her being as endowed with intelligence and 
freedom. It is a dignity that every human person possesses always and 
everywhere simply by being a person, and not by behaving rightly in the 
moral field. It is the dignity that flows from the being of the person and 
inheres in the being of the person and does not depend on the deeds of the 
person – whether these be right or wrong, whether these be right because 
they correspond to objective truth, or right because of invincible 
ignorance.51 
 
Thus, the fact that someone’s deeds may be objectively immoral—or that a 
governing majority in the community might regard the person’s deeds as 
immoral—does not strip that person of inherent human dignity, nor of the 
responsible freedom that inherently flows from that dignity. Legal 
restrictions on that person’s freedom, therefore, constitute an injury—a 
violation of the person’s human dignity—unless the coercive restriction is a 
“due restraint” mandated by the “just requirements of public order.” 
Pavan further explained that this ontological dignity of the human 
person consists of three key elements: “(1) the inescapable responsibility of 
every person to fix his or her relationship with God, (2) the nature and 
immediacy of the relationship between the person and truth, and (3) 
identity – or the need for the person to be himself or herself.”52 The 
                                                                                                                                      
Declaration] away from the old reasoning that ‘only truth has rights,’ ” section two of the Declaration 
constitutes “the big doctrinal turn, which needs to be manifest in all its incisiveness . . . . Even if a 
person ignores or rejects truth, still that person’s right to immunity from coercion stands undiminished; 
freedom is upheld even when it is invoked against truth. Therefore, the aim of compliance with the truth 
can never justify the bracketing of one’s personal right to immunity; no material upholding of truth ever 
justifies its perfunctory realization at the expense of personal freedom.” RICO, supra note 25, at 79, 80.  
50 RICO, supra note 25, at 65. 
51 Pietro Pavan, Ecumenism and Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, 1965–1975: A SYMPOSIUM ON A HISTORIC DOCUMENT 7, 15 (Walter J. Burghardt, S.J. ed., 
1976), quoted in RICO, supra note 25, at 65 (noting that “Pavan sometimes qualifies this dignity as 
‘existential’ or ‘ontological’ to make an unmistakable demarcation from any moral undertone. It is not a 
dignity dependent in any way on the rightness (objective or subjective) of one’s conscience. By this 
clarification, the pitfalls of the discussion of the rights of the erroneous conscience are avoided.”). 
52 Id.; see also id. at 20–21. Cf. Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 
YALE L.J. 1862 (2006). Greene argues that anti-sodomy laws threaten “the quite specific liberty to be 
oneself,” and describes this liberty as a right to metaprivacy: “the right to engage in status-definitional 
conduct free from normalizing governmental interference.” Id. at 1875; see also id. at 1866–67 
KALSCHEUR.DOC 11/28/2006  10:25:41 AM 
12 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 16:1 
 
elements of responsibility and immediacy suggest that human nature 
demands that each person enter into a relationship with God—with truth—
by her own free decision, without coercion. “Adherence to the truth cannot 
be forced. Nothing can come between the person and truth; any coercive 
interference can only harm.”53  
The element of identity concerns the relationship between one’s beliefs 
and the external expression of those beliefs through action in the world. 
Pavan insisted that the human dignity affirmed in the Declaration demands 
that one always be allowed to be oneself in thought, will, and action. This 
demand for continuity in thought, will, and action further supports 
recognition of immunity from any undue external, coercive restrictions: “to 
break this continuity in any sphere of life, but above all in the religious, by 
forcing a person to act in opposition to his own mind and will, or by 
hindering him from acting in harmony with either, is to harm deeply his 
dignity, to violate a fundamental right.”54 
Thus, Pavan understood the freedom to be oneself in an “indivisible 
unity” of thought, word, and action as central to the responsible freedom 
affirmed by the Declaration. Human dignity, therefore, gives rise to “a 
sphere of autonomy,”55 “a sanctuary that needs to be guarded against 
intrusion in order for [the person’s] dignity not to be harmed.”56 This 
sanctuary “grant[s] the inviolability of a personal realm within the confines 
of which the person may conduct his or herself on his or her own initiative 
and responsibility without the coercive interference of civil authorities or 
any other powers in society. Freedom means first securing the possibility to 
exert self-determination.”57 Autonomy, or responsible freedom, therefore, is 
understood as the freedom to take responsibility for the sort of person one 
chooses to become. Absent any threat to public order, therefore, human 
dignity demands that each person be given the possibility of deciding how 
to act, “even if it can be seen clearly that the way the person is deciding is 
objectively wrong.”58  
It must be emphasized that to speak of a sphere of autonomy in this 
sense is neither to promote “any kind of disconnected individualism”59 nor 
                                                                                                                                      
(identifying the right to metaprivacy, “the right to remain free of government interference with one’s 
transcendent identity,” is the “nonarbitrary principle that justifies [the] result” in Lawrence). 
53 RICO, supra note 25, at 66. 
54 Pavan, supra note 51, at 18 (emphasis added). 
55 See RICO, supra note 25, at 66 (quoting Pavan, supra note 51, at 171,172). 
56 See RICO, supra note 25, at 66 (quoting Pavan, supra note 51, at 171,172). 
57 See RICO, supra note 25, at 66 (quoting Pavan, supra note 51, at 171,172). Pavan insisted that the 
immunity from coercion affirmed in section two of the Declaration “ ‘must be understood thus: In the 
religious sphere no one may be compelled to act in a way different from that in which he himself has 
decided to act, and no man may be prevented from acting according to this way.’ ” See RICO, supra note 
25, at 67 (emphasis in original). The responsible freedom at the heart of human dignity is, thus, the 
freedom to assume responsibility for one’s life and relation to God through a personal decision. See 
RICO, supra note 25, at 67; see also RICO, supra note 25, at 68 (“ ‘Though all expressions of life may 
conform to the truth that has been grasped, they are not humanly valid if they are produced not through 
personal decision but under pressure from the surrounding world.’ ”). 
58 See RICO, supra note 25, at 67. 
59 See RICO, supra note 25, at 69. The Declaration notes that the search for truth takes place in a 
necessary social context which is also a demand of human nature: “Truth . . . is to be sought after in a 
manner proper to the dignity of the human person and his social nature. The inquiry is to be free, carried 
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to imply indifference toward the truth. The Declaration’s “emphasis on 
autonomous decision does not imply . . . any devaluation of the natural 
human obligation toward God and the moral duty before the truth.”60 
Instead, a reserved sphere of autonomy needs to be protected precisely so 
that the human person can fulfill her moral duty to pursue the truth in 
community in a humanly responsible manner. As Pavan explained, 
 
Vatican II presupposes the existence of an order of truth objective, 
universal, absolute, valid for all; order of truth of which the dignity of the 
human person is an essential element; dignity understood in an existential 
sense . . . ; order which everyone must strive to get to know, to which one 
must adhere in the measure one has already discovered it, and according 
to which one ought to live: freedom as right is affirmed in order that there 
may be no obstacles to act and celebrate freedom as duty, and as love for 
the good, above all for the supreme Good which is God.61 
 
Thus, the immunity from coercion affirmed in the Declaration recognizes a 
moral limit on the law’s ability to enforce moral duties toward God and the 
truth—a moral limit required by the order of truth of which the dignity of 
the human person is an essential element. The moral duties toward God and 
the truth still exist, but the law’s role is morally limited to protecting the 
public order of society.62  
B. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
In the course of affirming a right to religious freedom that includes 
immunity from coercion in religious matters, the Declaration elaborates a 
defense of limited, constitutional government. The Declaration holds that 
                                                                                                                                      
on with the aid of teaching or instruction, communication, and dialogue. In the course of these, men 
explain to one another the truth they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in order thus to 
assist one another in the quest for truth.” Declaration, supra note 10, at 680–81; see also RICO, supra 
note 25, at 70 (“The formation of one’s responsible decision takes place in social interchange, which 
cannot be regulated by force, but, instead, works through the method of rational persuasion and profits 
from the largest participation possible of all in a committed search for the common good.”). In terms of 
its orientation to both an objective order of truth and a necessary social context, this understanding of 
autonomy differs in significant respects from the autonomy celebrated in Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Lawrence. See infra text accompanying notes 176–177.  
60 RICO, supra note 25, at 68. 
61 RICO, supra note 25, at 69 (quoting Pietro Pavan, Il diritto della persona e delle comunità alla libertà 
sociale e civile in material religiosa, in SCRITTI/1: L’ANELITO DELL’UOMO ALLA LIBERTÀ (Mons. Franco 
Biffi ed., 1989)). 
62 See CHARLES CURRAN, THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 233 (2005) (“Freedom in the 
political sphere does not result from moral relativism but from respect for the dignity of the human 
person, who is to be free from external coercion in order to freely embrace the truth.”). Cf. Larry 
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts Morality’s Universal Empire WM. & 
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2007) (manuscript at 28, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900254) 
(“The argument for limiting law’s consideration of morality is inescapably a moral argument . . . .”); id. 
at 29 (Law exists as a limited domain because law is “the morally-prompted social institution that sees 
the moral value in settlement and the moral value in moral certainty.”). The moral value of the 
settlement function of law explains “why the moral enterprise of law is and must be at least partially 
closed to the direct consideration of morality itself. That law is so in the legal systems of the world we 
experience is not a moral failing of law – rather it is the embodiment of morality at morality’s fullest, 
and thus of morality’s best.” Id.  
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the state, acting through law, lacks the competence to impose compliance 
with religious truth. “The religious acts whereby men, in private and in 
public and out of a sense of personal conviction, direct their lives to God 
transcend by their very nature the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs”63 
that are the proper and limited field of action for human law. “[I]t would 
clearly transgress the limits set to [the state’s] power were it to presume to 
direct or inhibit acts that are religious.”64 
This immunity from coercion in religious matters does not, however, 
simply arise from the state’s incompetence to decide religious matters. The 
Declaration also insists that it is not the function of government acting 
through law to take total responsibility for the promotion of the common 
good of society. The common good of society “consists in the entirety of 
those conditions of social life under which men enjoy the possibility of 
achieving their own perfection in a certain fullness of measure and with 
some relative ease.”65 It is the obligation of all the members of society—
individuals, families, religious groups, voluntary associations, and the 
state—to promote the common good “in the manner proper to each.”66 
Thus, the Declaration affirms that there is a distinction between society 
and the state, and insists that the state’s role in promoting the common 
good is limited.67 Accordingly, conduct, including conduct flowing from 
religious convictions, only becomes a proper concern of the state acting 
through law when that conduct implicates that dimension of the common 
good which is the state’s proper role to promote. The Declaration 
characterizes this dimension of the common good as “public order.” The 
maintenance of public order is the necessary—but limited—function that 
the state legitimately exercises in promoting the common good. 
Part Seven of the Declaration provides the central text articulating the 
moral limitations on government action. The Declaration first observes that 
“society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses”68 that can 
arise from the exercise of all freedoms in society, including the exercise of 
religious freedom. It is the state’s particular, proper, and limited role to 
provide this protection through law: 
 
 It is the special duty of government to provide this protection. 
However, government is not to act in arbitrary fashion or in an unfair 
                                                                                                                                      
63 Declaration, supra note 10, at 681. 
64 Declaration, supra note 10, at 681.  
65 Declaration, supra note 10, at 683. 
66 Declaration, supra note 10, at 683. See also John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of State 
Religion, 12 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 155, 158 (1951) (“[T]he whole society . . . has the function of 
preserving and developing itself as a whole. There is a good-of-the-whole, a common good, the social 
good, pluralist in structure but still somehow one.”). 
67 See also MURRAY supra note 3, at 81 (“We distinguish between the state and society, between the 
relatively narrow order of law as such and the wider order of the total public good.”). For further 
discussion of the importance of the distinction between state and society, see Gregory A. Kalscheur, 
S.J., John Paul II, John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A 
Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 231, 245–48, 
265–66 (2004). 
68 Declaration, supra note 10, at 686. 
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spirit of partisanship. Its action is to be controlled by juridical norms 
which are in conformity with the objective moral order. 
 These norms arise out of the need for effective safeguard of the rights 
of all citizens and for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights. They flow 
from the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes 
about when men live together in good order and in true justice. They 
come, finally, out of the need for a proper guardianship of public morality. 
These matters constitute the basic component of the common welfare: 
they are what is meant by public order. 
 For the rest the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in 
their full range. These require that the freedom of man be respected as far 
as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary.69  
 
Commenting on this text, John Courtney Murray suggested that 
“secular experts may well consider” this last sentence—what Murray called 
the principle of the integrity of freedom in society— “to be the most 
significant sentence in the Declaration. It is a statement of the basic 
principle of the ‘free society.’ ” This principle, and the moral limits on 
governmental action that flow from it, serves to safeguard the responsible 
freedom rooted in human dignity that is the foundation of the entire 
Declaration. In order to safeguard the dignity giving rise to the demand for 
responsible freedom, the powers of government must be limited. In other 
words, government must be “constitutional.”70 
Murray thus saw the Declaration as a juridical formula—a statement of 
the rights and duties governing the relationship between the person and the 
state, as well as the limitations on governmental power that are necessary to 
safeguard human dignity. The responsible freedom that is a manifestation 
of human dignity demands recognition of a sphere of human activity whose 
integrity must be protected from coercive intrusion. This protected sphere 
encompasses those activities that do not implicate public order concerns. 
The government is not to enter into the sphere itself; it is not “there to pass 
moral or theological judgments on the beliefs expressed, or on the actions 
performed, within the sphere. Such judgments are ‘unconstitutional,’ 
beyond the competence of purely juridical authority.”71 
                                                                                                                                      
69 Declaration, supra note 10, at 686–87; see also Declaration, supra note 10, at 685 (“[G]overnment is 
to see to it that the equality of citizens before the law, which is itself an element of the common welfare, 
is never violated for religious reasons whether openly or covertly. Nor is there to be discrimination 
among citizens.”). 
70 See Murray, supra note 27, at 573 (The principle of the free society articulated in section seven of 
Declaration (“as much freedom as possible, and only as much restraint as necessary”) and the principle 
of equality before the law (see Declaration, supra note 10 at 685, quoted in supra note 69) “furnish the 
solution to the political issue raised by the question of religious freedom as the immunity of the person 
from coercive restraint of action in accordance with his own beliefs. Together they require that 
government should be ‘constitutional.’ ”); see also RICO, supra note 25, at 36 (“The argument for the 
universal right to religious freedom almost resolves itself in a defense of the constitutional 
government.”); cf. Notes on the Declaration, supra note 2, at 676 n.2 (The Declaration manifests 
“direct continuity with two basic doctrinal themes of John XXIII in the encyclical Pacem in Terris: the 
dignity of the human person and the consequent necessity of constitutional limits to the powers of 
government.”).  
71 John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in VATICAN II: AN INTERFAITH 
APPRAISAL, supra note 27, at 568 (emphasis added). A similar argument for the proposition that there  
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The Declaration, therefore, rests on a moral argument about the 
requirements of human dignity that concludes by characterizing the state as 
“a purely juridical authority.” The state’s role is not to take direct 
responsibility for the entire common good of society, which would include 
direct responsibility over the moral character of individuals whose 
flourishing is the ultimate criterion establishing the requirements of the 
common good. Respect for the demands made by human dignity instead 
restricts the government’s legitimate role to the more limited juridical 
function of preserving that limited component of the common good 
characterized as public order. As Bryan Hehir explains: 
 
The public order criterion assumes that the state has positive moral 
responsibilities, but it sets limits to the use of the coercive power of the 
state through civil law. The limit is set by the requirement that an issue 
must be shown to affect directly the core values of public order (i.e. public 
peace, defense of rights and public morality) before an appeal can be 
made to invoke the prohibitions or prescriptions of civil law. The use of 
the public order criterion is first found in Catholic teaching in Vatican II; 
the previous guide for civil law had been the more expansive concept that 
the state and the law should be invoked to promote the common good.72 
 
The use of the public order criterion thus marks a crucial development 
within the tradition of Catholic social thought; a development that Murray 
described as a shift from an “ethical” to a “juridical” or political view of 
the state. 
According to the ethical view of the state, the function of government 
was to lead the subject of governmental authority “toward the life of virtue 
by the force of good laws reflecting the demands of the moral order.”73 
Murray saw this understanding of the state at work in the encyclicals of 
Leo XIII, whose teachings on religious freedom and the proper relationship 
                                                                                                                                      
are simply certain things that a limited, constitutional government cannot do was made by Justice 
Chase: 
 
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and 
without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, 
or fundamental law, of the State . . . . The purposes for which men enter into society will 
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the 
legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature and ends of 
legislative power will limit the exercise of it . . . . There are acts which the Federal or State 
Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority . . . . An ACT of the Legislature (for 
I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be 
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. 
 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798). 
See also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 214 n. 45 (1988) (characterizing Justice Chase 
“as a participant in the ‘catholic’ strain of American constitutional theory” which recognizes unwritten 
constitutional tradition as a limit on governmental power). 
72 J. Bryan Hehir, The Consistent Ethic: Public Policy Implications, in CONSISTENT ETHIC OF LIFE 218, 
227 (T.G. Fuechtmann, ed., 1988) (emphasis added).  
73 John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in CHANGE IN OFFICIAL 
CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHINGS 1, 9 (READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY NO. 13) (Charles Curran ed., 
2003).  
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between church and state reflected the notion that “error has no rights.” The 
ruler’s duty was to render society virtuous from the top down. The role of 
government was paternal, and society was understood as the “family writ 
large,” with the ruler as paterfamilias.74 Murray noted that, in Leo XIII’s 
encyclicals, the traditional Catholic “distinction between society and state 
was largely lost from view.”75 Moreover, 
 
nowhere in the immense body of Leo XIII’s writings is there to be found a 
satisfactory philosophy of human law and jurisprudence. He was always 
the moralist, not the jurist. His concern was to insist that the juridical 
order of society must recognize the imperatives of the objective moral 
order.76 
 
In contrast, Murray saw a development toward the political or juridical 
view of the state in the teachings of Pius XII and John XXIII. The threat of 
twentieth-century totalitarianism led both popes to focus more attention on 
the necessary distinctions between state and society. Totalitarianism was 
seen as “threatening the basic dignity of the human person, which is his 
freedom,” and Pius XII, therefore, “revived the distinction between society 
and state, the essential barrier against totalitarianism.”77 This distinction 
provided the foundation for a key insight: “society is to be built and 
rendered virtuous from the bottom up, as it were; the role of government is 
subordinate, a role of service to the human person.”78 Government is 
simply political, and the relation between the person and the state is not 
familial, but simply civil. The primary function of government is, therefore, 
juridical: 
 
The protection and promotion of the exercise of human and civil rights 
and the facilitation of the discharge of human and civil duties by the 
                                                                                                                                      
74 See id. at 10. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. Murray sometimes described the ethical view, whose roots are in classical and medieval political 
philosophy, as the “Leonine doctrine,” because of the role it played in the encyclicals of Leo XIII. See 
id. Leo XIII’s understanding of the state’s role in promoting moral truth led him to reject calls for 
religious freedom, and Murray’s great scholarly accomplishment was to demonstrate how the doctrine 
affirmed in the Declaration on Religious Freedom was, in fact, more faithful to the traditional Christian 
understanding of the proper relationship between state, society, and the human person. See CURRAN, 
supra note 62, at 228, 246 n. 33 (discussing Leo XIII’s encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum and the 
pre-Vatican II notion that “error has no rights” and citing Murray’s scholarship on the Leonine 
understanding of the state). Cf. JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 235–
39 (1998) (arguing that affirmation of the subsidiary role of the state can be drawn from the work of 
Thomas Aquinas).  
77 See Murray, supra note 73, at 11. Murray notes that Leo XIII gave little attention to the moral limits 
on the state and the distinction between state and society because he was faced with a different 
“polemic necessity”—the need to counter the “moral antinomianism and juridical positivism of 
continental laicism.” Murray, supra note 73, at 10. See also Murray, supra note 73, at 4–5 (“The order 
of civil law and political jurisdiction was not simply being differentiated from the order of moral law 
and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; a complete rupture was made between the two orders of law and the two 
authorities, and they were set at hostile variance, each with the other. Society and state were not 
invested with their due secularity; they were roughly clothed in the alien garments of continental 
laicism.”) (emphasis added). In contrast, the doctrine affirmed in the Declaration on Religious Freedom 
recognizes “a proper and legitimate secularity of society and state.” Murray, supra note 73, at 4. 
78 Murray, supra note 73, at 4.  
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citizen who is fully citizen, that is, not merely subject to, but participant 
in, the processes of government. . . . “Man as such, so far from being 
regarded as the object of social life or a passive element thereof, is rather 
to be considered its subject, foundation and end.”79  
 
Like Murray, John Finnis also sees the understanding of the role of the 
state articulated in the Declaration as representative of a shift away from a 
traditional understanding of the state (with roots in classical Athens) toward 
a “standard modern position” in which the state has a limited and 
subsidiary role with respect to the moral formation of the human person.80 
The older view held that “the state should encourage true worth and 
discourage immorality,” from which it followed that the state could 
legitimately exercise a “directly parental disciplinary role” with respect to 
the moral conduct of citizens—including consenting adults.81 
The standard modern position, in contrast, reflects the distinction 
between the proper roles of state and society in promoting morality, and 
“considers that the state’s proper responsibility for upholding true worth 
(morality) is a responsibility subsidiary (auxiliary) to the primary 
responsibility of parents and non-political voluntary associations.”82 
Pursuant to this conception of the state, “the proper role of government has 
been taken to exclude the state from assuming a directly parental 
disciplinary role in relation to consenting adults.” 83 In contrast, the state 
acting through law does have a legitimate role in supervising the influences 
on moral development that are manifest in the public realm or environment. 
However, because the state has a limited, subsidiary role in promoting 
human fulfillment, the state does not have the legitimate authority “to 
direct people to virtue and deter them from vice by making even secret and 
truly consensual adult acts of vice a punishable offence against the state’s 
laws.”84 
Finnis finds this distinction appropriate for reasons that echo Pavan’s 
elaboration of the right to religious freedom.85 The state acting through law 
cannot “make” people good, moral, or virtuous in the same way that a 
craftsman makes a good chair by imposing his design on the wood with 
                                                                                                                                      
79 Murray, supra note 73, at 9 (quoting Pius XII). 
80 See John Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1052–53, 
1070–76 (1994) [hereinafter Finnis, Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation]; see also John Finnis, Is 
Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND 
MORALITY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 1, 6–7 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) [hereinafter Finnis, Natural 
Law Theory]. 
81 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1052. 
82 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80 (emphasis in original).  
83 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1052 (A state adhering to the 
standard modern position “has by no means renounced its legitimate concern with public morality and 
the education of children and young people towards truly worthwhile and against alluring but bad forms 
of conduct and life.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 116–121. Cf. Andrew Koppleman, Does 
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV 1635, 1679 (2005) (While pornography can cause 
moral harm, the law should not criminalize the sale of pornography to adults. “Parents can appropriately 
decide that certain materials are worthless and harmful, and that children cannot be trusted to see them. 
But it is not a light thing to treat adult citizens as if they were children.”). 
84 Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 8.  
85 See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
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which he is exercising his expert technique. Instead, “helping citizens to 
choose and act in line with integral human fulfillment must involve 
something which goes beyond any art or technique. For only individual 
acting persons can by their own choices make themselves good or evil.”86 
The state thus has a proper role in helping87 people to make virtuous 
choices, but the state is incapable of “making” people good or evil. People 
have to be allowed to exercise responsible freedom: they must be left free 
to make the self-constituting choices through which they make themselves 
good or evil. The individual’s exercise of practical reasonableness in 
choosing how to live is itself an intrinsic dimension of human flourishing 
that the individual should be free to pursue unless that pursuit threatens the 
rights of others or degrades the public environment in which all pursue 
their flourishing.88  
The state serves a properly subsidiary role; government acting through 
law fulfills its limited role when it, as the “public managing structure” of 
society, helps to secure a public economic and cultural environment that 
will allow all the different individuals and groups who make up society to 
pursue their fulfillment (which includes moral virtue). And government 
possesses no legitimate authority to act beyond this subsidiary role. For the 
state to use “its public powers, and law’s coercive pedagogy, to require of 
all citizens the acts and forbearances which will advance their fulfillment 
and complete virtue” is for the state to engage in an effort that is “an abuse 
of public power, ultra vires because directed to an end which state 
government and law do not truly have.”89 Because it is an institution with a 
limited, subsidiary role, government as understood by Finnis, Murray, and 
Vatican II “is precisely not presented . . . as dedicated to the coercive 
                                                                                                                                      
86 Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 7–8 (emphasis added). 
87 Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 5–6 (“[The state’s] purpose must be to carry out a 
function which the Jesuit social theorists of the early twentieth century taught us to call subsidiarity 
(i.e., helping, from the Latin subsidium, help) . . . .”); see also FINNIS, supra note 76, at 235 
(“[G]overnments’ or lawmakers’ responsibility to promote virtue does not authorize them to require 
more than the actions and forbearances necessary, directly or indirectly, for maintaining public and 
interpersonal good.”); FINNIS, supra note 76, at 237 (For Aquinas, the individual was not to be 
subordinated to the political community; “[H]ere we may add Aquinas’ partial anticipation of the 
principle of subsidiarity: ‘it is contrary to the proper character of the state’s governance to impede 
people from acting according to their responsibilities – except in emergencies’.”); FINNIS, supra note 
76, at 237 n.82 (According to the principle of subsidiarity, “it is unjust for more extensive associations 
to assume functions which can be performed efficiently by individuals or by less extensive associations, 
since the proper function of instrumental associations is to help their members help themselves.”). 
88 See FINNIS, supra note 76, at 245 (the lives of individuals and families “directly instantiate basic 
goods”); FINNIS, supra note 76, at 247–48 (Government acting through law has the subsidiary function 
of helping individuals and families to do what they cannot do well on their own; “[I]ndividuals and 
families cannot well secure and maintain the elements which make up the public good of justice and 
peace . . . . And so their instantiation of basic goods is less secure and full than it can be if public justice 
and peace are maintained by law . . . in a way that no individual or private group can appropriately 
undertake or match. Individuals’ and groups’ need for political community is that need, and the political 
community’s specific [limited] common good is, accordingly that public good.”). 
89 FINNIS, supra note 76, at 239; see also FINNIS, supra note 76, at 228 (“[T]hose vices of disposition 
and conduct which have no significant relationship, direct or indirect, to justice and peace are not the 
concern of state government or law. [This] position [of Aquinas] is not readily distinguishable from the 
‘grand simple principle’ . . . of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.”); Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 
80, at 4 (“The government of political communities is rationally limited not only by constitutional law 
and by the moral norms which limit every decent person’s deliberation and choice, but also by the 
inherent limits of its general justifying aim, purpose or rationale.”). 
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promotion of virtue and the repression of vice, as such, even though virtue 
(and vice) are of supreme and constitutive importance for the well-being 
(or otherwise) of individual persons and the worth (or otherwise) of their 
associations.”90  
C. THE JUST DEMANDS OF PUBLIC ORDER 
As we have seen, the Declaration adopts the concept of public order as 
the moral principle that limits the legitimate action of government. The 
dignity of the human person demands immunity from coercion in the 
exercise of responsible freedom,91 “except where just demands of public 
order are proven to have the urgency of a higher force.”92 The state’s 
properly subsidiary role in promoting the common good is defined by the 
demands of public order. The Declaration articulates the demands of public 
order in terms of three criteria:  
 
1. the effective protection of the rights of all citizens and the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts of rights; 
2. the adequate protection of that just public peace which is to be found 
where people live together in good order and true justice; and 
3. the proper guardianship of public morality.93 
 
These three criteria reflect the understanding of public order articulated by 
Murray in the years leading up to the Council’s promulgation of the 
Declaration. 
Murray characterizes public order as that limited segment of the 
common good that is committed directly to the care of the state; that 
limited area in which “the public powers may legitimately apply their 
                                                                                                                                      
90 Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 6–7 (emphasis added). But cf. Robert P. George, The 
Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 28–31 (2000) (disagreeing with Finnis’ proposed 
principled moral limit to the authority of the state to enforce morality); id. at 30 (“[P]erhaps I’ve caught 
John Finnis, in his great generosity of spirit, straining to find a kernel of wisdom in the liberal account 
of freedom and public morality.”). 
91 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Arguments for the Human Right to Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 229, 241 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1993). The vision 
of the relationship between the human person, society, and the state manifest in the Declaration is 
fundamentally oriented toward freedom: 
 
The foundation of human society lies in the truth about the human person, or in its dignity, 
that is, in its demand for responsible freedom. That which in justice is preeminently owed to 
the person is freedom – as much freedom as possible – in order that society thus may be 
borne toward its goals, which are those of the human person itself, by the strength and 
energies of persons in society bound together with one another by love. Truth and justice, 
therefore, and love itself demand that the practice of freedom in society be kept vigorous, 
especially with respect to the goods belonging to the human spirit and so much more with 
respect to religion. Now this demand for freedom, following as it does from the objective 
truth of the person in society and from justice itself, naturally engenders the juridical 
relationship between the person and the public power. The public power is duty bound to 
acknowledge the truth about the person, to protect and advance the person, and to render the 
justice owed the person. Id.  
 
92 Id.  
93 See Declaration, supra note 10, at 686–87 (quoted in the text accompanying supra note 69). 
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coercive powers.”94 Murray identified three goods that can and must be 
achieved by the power proper to the state, “the power inherent in the 
coercive discipline of public law”: 
 
The first is the public peace, which is the highest political good. The 
second is public morality, as determined by moral standards commonly 
accepted among the people. The third is justice, which secures for the 
people what is due them. And the first thing that is due to people in justice 
is their freedom, the enjoyment of their personal and social rights. . . .95  
 
Murray further specified his understanding of the limited sphere of 
public order in the work presenting his most comprehensive articulation of 
Catholicism’s potential contribution to American public discourse: We Hold 
These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition.96 In 
Chapter Seven of We Hold These Truths, Murray notes that the American 
mind “has never been clear about the relation between morals and law. 
These two orders of reality are frequently confused, in either one of two 
ways.”97 
The first confusion stems from a failure to understand the difference 
between moral precepts and civil statutes. While there is truth in the 
medieval adage that “whatever is right ought to be a law,” its truth does not 
lie in the notion that coercive statutes, backed up by state police power, 
should compel people to do whatever is right.98 Instead, the adage means 
that whatever is right ought to become a customary norm of life; “the moral 
order ought to be reflected in the habitual order of everyday life and 
                                                                                                                                      
94 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 503, 
520 (1964). 
95 Id. at 521 (emphasis added). Charles Curran has suggested that the order of justice identified by 
Murray and the Declaration on Religious Freedom should be understood to include “social justice and 
human rights . . . . The state should intervene to protect basic human rights, to promote economic rights 
. . . and also to prevent public disturbances of the peace.” CHARLES E. CURRAN, DIRECTIONS IN 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS 132 (1985). Curran concludes that neither Murray nor the Vatican declaration 
focused on “social justice as a legitimate and necessary function of government and law.” Perhaps their 
focus on the narrow issue of religious freedom precluded them from giving “enough importance to the 
role of the state in preserving and promoting social justice.” Id. at 133. Robert McElroy describes five 
legitimate state objectives identified by Murray within the subsidiary common good that is called public 
order: (1) the Thomistic or juristic end (domestic tranquility understood as unity in political society 
achieved by law and stable social structures); (2) the Augustinian end (protection of the moral standards 
of the community; this end “gives substance to society because it supports all the procedures of law and 
the total edifice of tranquility that we call peace”); (3) the end of freedom (the empowerment to do what 
one ought and immunity from being constrained to do what one ought not to do); (4) the Christian end 
(government’s obligation to seek to attain a fullness of human welfare); and, (5) the power end 
(government’s responsibility for the common defense of the nation from external enemies). See ROBERT 
W. MCELROY, THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN PUBLIC THEOLOGY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN 
COURTNEY MURRAY 86 (1989) (citing John Courtney Murray, S.J., Analysis for the Rockefeller 
Brothers’ Project 28–29, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY PAPERS (available at the Georgetown University 
library)). 
96 MURRAY, supra note 3, at v. In his preface to the 1986 edition of We Hold These Truths, Walter 
Burghardt, S.J., notes that Murray, the “architect of Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom[,] 
has been increasingly recognized as primarily responsible for bringing the Catholic tradition on Church, 
state, and society into civilized conversation with the ‘American proposition’ of pluralist democracy.” 
MURRAY, supra note 3, at v. 
97 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156.  
98 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156. 
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action.”99 Moreover, while the reverse formulation of the medieval adage is 
also true, “whatever is law (custom) ought to be right,” it does not mean 
that customs oblige simply because they exist. Instead, they are obligatory 
because of their rightness—their reflection of the moral order.100 Thus, we 
need to be wary of those who shout, “There ought to be a law!” without 
considering whether the matter of concern is the sort of good or evil “that 
the law can, or ought to, cope with.”101 
The second confusion flows from this failure to understand that the law 
is not meant to deal with every sort of moral evil. It finds expression in the 
notion that, “if what is moral ought by that fact to be legal, it follows that 
what is legal is by that fact also moral.”102 This confusion reflects a sort of 
moral chaos that stems from “ignorance of the traditional rules of 
jurisprudence”—that “subtle discipline, at once a science and an art, that 
mediates between the imperatives of the moral order and the commands or 
prohibitions of the civil law.”103 This “subtle discipline” reminds us that 
there is a difference between private sin and public crime, 104 a distinction 
between private morality and public morality. 
Moreover, “unless this distinction, like that between morality and law, 
is grasped, the result is a fiasco of all morality.”105 The foolish position that 
all sins should be crimes devolves into the “knavish” position that those 
acts that are not crimes are not even sins.106 “Upon [this] foolish disregard 
of the distinction between private and public morality there ensues a 
knavish denial that there is any such thing as public morality.”107 
This distinction is rooted in the more fundamental distinctions between 
society and state and between the common good and public order. It is a 
basic principle of jurisprudence that “morals and law are differentiated in 
character, and not coextensive in their functions”; the civil law should not 
forbid everything that the moral law forbids or enjoin everything that the 
moral law commands.108 “The moral law governs the entire order of human 
conduct, personal and social; it extends even to motivations and interior 
acts.” The civil law, in contrast, “looks only to the public order of human 
society; it touches only external acts, and regards only values that are 
                                                                                                                                      
99 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156. 
100 See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156. 
101 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156. 
102 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 157. 
103 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156.  
104 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156. See also Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 838 (“Jesus’ definitions of 
adultery and murder proved that immorality and illegality cannot and must not be coextensive. God’s 
law reigns over a broad empire that man’s law cannot hope to govern.”). Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount 
offers radically interior understandings of murder and adultery. See Matthew 5:21–22 (NRSV) (“You 
have heard it said to those of ancient times, ‘you shall not murder’ and ‘murderers shall be liable to 
judgment.’ But I say to you that if you are angry with a brother or sister, you will be liable to  
judgment . . . .”); Matthew 5:27–28 (NRSV) (“You have heart that it was said, ‘You shall not commit 
adultery.’ But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already committed 
adultery with her in his heart.”). 
105 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 158. 
106 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 158. 
107 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 158. 
108 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 165–66. 
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formally social. For this reason the scope of the law is limited.”109 
Moreover, because civil law ultimately operates through coercion, it can 
only have a limited effect on shaping internal moral character—“men can 
be coerced only into a minimal amount of moral action.”110 As a result, 
Murray concludes that: 
 
[T]he moral aspirations of the law are minimal. Law seeks to establish 
and maintain only that minimum of actualized morality that is necessary 
for the healthy functioning of the social order. It does not look to what is 
morally desirable, or attempt to remove every moral taint from the 
atmosphere of society. It enforces only what is minimally acceptable, and 
in this sense socially necessary.111 
 
If society wishes to elevate and maintain moral standards above this 
minimal level of social necessity, it must look to institutions other than the 
law.112 This contention highlights Murray’s view of the crucial role played 
by voluntary, mediating institutions—for example, the church, the family, 
the school—in working to build up the common good through efforts to 
raise the level of public morality.113 All of these institutions have a 
legitimate role to play with respect to issues of public morality; the field is 
not left to the state and the law alone.114 This again emphasizes the 
importance of Murray’s distinction between society and state. The state and 
the law have a necessary—but necessarily limited—role to play in civil 
society’s goal of establishing and maintaining the common good. 
Thus, while law and morality are related, they are also differentiated. 
The premises of the law are ultimately found in the moral law—reason 
compels civil society to seek the common good and to recognize that the 
effort to secure some aspects of the common good may require the help of 
the state acting through the coercive force of the law. Moreover, civil law 
invariably looks to the “moralization of society.”115 The civil law concerns 
itself with public morality. But given its mode of action, which is 
ultimately coercion, the law must not moralize excessively. If it does so, “it 
                                                                                                                                      
109 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 166.  
110 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 166. See also MCELROY, supra note 95, at 88 (“Law, in Murray’s view, 
had to be rooted in morality. But its aims were not to generate a truly moral society; rather, [its aims] 
consisted of establishing a threshold of moral standards in society.”). 
111 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 166. 
112 Cf. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 831 (“[L]aw works best when its ambitions are modest. . . . The 
grander ambitions our law seems to have . . . are proper jobs for ethicists or philosophers, or perhaps 
doctors and economists, but not for lawyers and judges.”). 
113 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 166. 
114 Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (1990) (“The principle of free exercise of religion effectively removes 
government from the development and transmission of virtue at its most fundamental level – thus 
devolving upon voluntary religious societies . . . the central function thought by ‘republicans’ to be 
vested in the state. The free exercise principle therefore . . . points . . . toward a social order that is 
neither strictly individualistic nor statist in its understanding of the good.”). 
115 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 166. 
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tends to defeat even its own modest aims, by bringing itself into 
contempt.”116 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the public morality component of 
public order may be the most difficult of the three dimensions of public 
order to define and apply.117 Scholars like Christopher Wolfe and Robert 
George use the term “public morality” to refer to the public enforcement of 
moral standards to promote the common good by directly shaping the 
character of citizens.118 Yet this understanding of public morality cannot be 
what is meant by the term as it is used in the Declaration—such an 
understanding would fail to reflect the Declaration’s affirmation of a 
limited, subsidiary role for the state in promoting the common good,119 and 
it would fail to protect the right to religious freedom itself from illegitimate 
infringement if the public chooses to enforce compliance with religious 
truth as an aspect of the common good that the state should promote.  
Charles Curran, following Murray, distinguishes between public 
morality and private morality, and characterizes public morality as “the 
                                                                                                                                      
116 MURRAY, supra note 3, at 166; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE [THE GOSPEL OF 
LIFE] §71, at 130 (1995) (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, q. 96, a.2) (stating that 
legal precepts that expect too much virtue will be despised by imperfect men, who will hold law in 
contempt and break into greater evils); Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 838 (“[L]egal moralism is 
almost always counterproductive. . . . Good moral principles are often vague and open-ended, and they 
reach into every nook and cranny of our lives and thoughts. Legal principles that have these qualities 
only serve to invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement [which] in turn invite contempt for the 
law. Moral education becomes an exercise in educating the public in bad morals.”). Cf. PERRY, LOVE 
AND POWER, supra note 7, at 134 (noting that “‘[t]he central problem . . . of the legal enterprise is the 
relation of love to power.’ If we are compassionate, and if we value community, we will be especially 
wary about relying on extreme coercion: The costs – extreme suffering and extreme resentment – are 
great and sometimes terrible.” (quoting JOHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW xii (1976))). 
117 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 215 (1980) (noting that “neither 
‘morality’ nor ‘public order’ is a term clear in its meaning (quite apart from any substantive 
controversies about the requirements of morality or public order).”) Some of the ambiguity with respect 
to morality stems from the tendency in modern legal usage to equate “morality” almost exclusively with 
sexual morality, while in philosophical usage, sexual morality “is merely one small portion of the 
requirements of practical reasonableness.” Appending the adjective “public” to the noun “morality,” as 
is the case in many international human rights documents referring to “public order or morals” may not 
resolve the ambiguity. Finnis further notes that the term “public order” suffers from its own 
“irremediable ambiguity;” in common law systems the term refers to “absence of disorder,” while the 
civil law concept of ordre public (which Finnis understands to be at work in section seven of the 
Declaration) is “almost as wide as the concept of public policy in common law.” Id. See also 
HOLLENBACH, supra note 27, at 91 (noting the existence of “serious disagreements about where to draw 
the line between the domain of public morality (where civil law has a legitimate role to play) and that of 
private morality (where civil freedom should prevail)”). 
118 See, e.g., Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 
65 (2000) (“Public morality . . . concerns laws and public actions focused on the moral conduct and 
especially the stable patterns of conduct (character) of individual citizens. The question of what role the 
political community should take in promoting norms of morality for citizens is at the heart of public 
morality. The focal cases of public morality are those involving laws that limit certain forms of conduct 
of consenting adults, on the grounds that they are morally wrong.”); George, supra note 90, at 28–31 
(rejecting Finnis’s attempt to place a principled moral limit on the state’s authority to enforce morality). 
119 See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 118, at 68 (“The permission of particular acts by a community has 
something of an educative effect, contributing to the ‘normalization’ and hence the legitimization of 
such acts. . . . Conversely, the absence of laws may make certain practices more widespread, and 
thereby contribute to people’s sense that such conduct is normal or at least unobjectionable, and it may 
help to shape people’s ideas about whether certain conduct is legitimate, since society withholds any 
negative public judgment about that conduct.”) (emphasis added). Cf. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 157–58 
(on the confusion inherent in this position). 
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morality necessary for people to live together in society.”120 For this to be a 
workable formula, however, we need to have a clearer sense of what sorts 
of moral regulations are “necessary” for life together in society. In a helpful 
effort to elaborate this concept, John Finnis argues that the “public 
morality” criterion involves “the preservation of a social environment 
conducive to virtue.”121 
Finnis draws a crucial distinction between two different sorts of legal 
supervision: (1) “supervising the truly private consensual conduct of 
adults” and (2) “supervising the public realm or environment.”122 The use 
of legal coercion to supervise and control the truly private consensual 
conduct of adults—the sphere that Murray would identify with private 
morality—falls outside the state’s limited subsidiary role in promoting the 
common good of society.123 As noted above, the state’s purpose is not to 
“make” people wholly virtuous through legal coercion.124 When the law 
tries to do this, the law improperly restrains the exercise of responsible 
freedom. 
The limited, subsidiary role of the state acting through law, however, 
does properly extend to supervising and securing the sort of social milieu in 
which individuals and groups can pursue their own flourishing. To say that 
the state’s role in promoting public order includes the end of promoting 
public morality is to say that the state can properly use the tool of legal 
coercion to promote the sort of public “moral-cultural-educational 
                                                                                                                                      
120 CURRAN, supra note 95, at 132. See also CURRAN, supra note 95, at 133 (“The theory proposed here 
is fundamentally that found in the Declaration on Religious Liberty of the Second Vatican Council, 
which itself is heavily based on the work of John Courtney Murray.”). 
121 Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 6; Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 
supra note 80, at 1073. See also FINNIS, supra note 117, at 215–18, 229 (discussing public order and 
public morality as those concepts are used in the Declaration and contemporary human rights 
documents). 
122 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1053.  
123 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1053; see also Finnis, Law, 
Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1076 (The rationale that justifies the state’s use of 
legal coercion does not “require[ ] or authorize[ ] the state to direct people to virtue and deter them from 
vice by making even secret and truly consensual adult acts of vice a punishable offence against the 
state’s laws.”). Finnis explains that, “[a]part from such special arrangements as marriage, no one’s 
human rights include a right that other men or women should not conduct themselves sexually in certain 
ways.” FINNIS, supra note 117, at 216. Within the special context of marriage, spouses do have a right 
to expect sexual fidelity from one another. Society as a whole, however, does not have a right to expect 
that every sin be made a crime. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 157–58, 166. It should be emphasized 
that recognition of a sphere of private morality that is beyond the proper reach of law does not mean 
that all conduct that occurs in private is beyond the proper reach of the law. Justice and peace can be 
violated in private, as when domestic violence occurs within the family home. The law properly extends 
to violations of rights within private settings. See FINNIS, supra note 76, at 251 (“The public good of 
justice is not restricted to ‘public spaces’ or the transactions of public business. It can be desirable to get 
the rule of law into some private relationships which otherwise become the occasion of injustice, wrong 
done by one person to another.”); see also State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 462–63 (R.I. 2006) (no 
constitutionally protected liberty interest prevents the criminal law from operating to address domestic 
violence in the home).  
124 See supra text accompanying notes 85–88. See also Kaveny, supra note 6, at 352–53(“According to 
Thomas [Aquinas], the major concern of the positive law . . . is not the inner disposition of the acting 
agents, but instead, the external situation of right relations that ideally would be produced when such 
agents act virtuously. Consequently, the law targets its strictures on actions that disturb the appropriate 
situation of right relations between various members of society, not on actions primarily affecting the 
character of the agent.”). 
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environment”125 in which human rights can be securely enjoyed: “[A] 
context or framework of mutual respect and trust and common 
understanding, an environment which is physically healthy and in which 
the weak can go about without fear of the whims of the strong.”126  
The use of law to secure a public environment or milieu conducive to 
human flourishing extends to each of the elements of public order. There is, 
for example, a socially shared benefit to maintaining a milieu in which the 
law protects individuals’ rights and preserves public peace: “Rioting and 
bombing, and threats thereof, are not merely prejudicial to the rights of 
those killed or injured, but to everyone who has now to live in a community 
where such things happen.”127 Similarly, Finnis explains that “[t]he 
operation of a grossly noisy aeroplane can be said to violate the rights of 
those awakened and deafened by it, but the problem is quite reasonably 
described as one of public order or public nuisance and not pinned down to 
the rights of those who happen to have been affected.”128 
These examples focus on the maintenance of a physical environment 
“essential to the well-being of all members of a community, especially the 
weak.”129 The concept of public morality extends a similar concern to 
supervising the public moral-cultural-educational environment that allows 
individuals to pursue their own proper good.130 The law, for example, has a 
role to play in shaping the public milieu in which parents raise their 
children, including the way in which that public milieu influences or 
inhibits the development of character and virtue. 
Laws regulating sexuality in the public realm fall within this 
understanding of the public morality element of public order. Finnis notes 
that sexuality is a powerful force that needs to be “integrated with other 
aspects of human personality and well-being.”131 It seems to be the case 
that human sexual psychology can tend “towards regarding other persons 
as bodily objects of desire . . . and as mere items in an erotically flavoured 
classification (e.g., ‘women’), rather than as full persons.”132 Accordingly, 
there is reason for using the law to “foster[ ] a milieu in which children can 
be brought up (and parents assisted rather than hindered in bringing them 
up) so that they are relatively free from inward subjection to an egoistic, 
impulsive, or depersonalized sexuality.”133 
                                                                                                                                      
125 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1053. 
126 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 216. 
127 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 217. 
128 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 218. 
129 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 217. 
130 See Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1075 (The state properly acts 
through law for the end of “securing an economic and cultural environment in which all [individuals 
and lawful associations] can pursue their own proper good.”). 
131 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 217. 
132 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 217. See also Koppleman, supra note 83, at 1647–55 (discussing 
objectification, the power of sex, and the need to protect children). 
133 FINNIS, supra note 117, at 217. Finnis argues that legal supervision of the public realm or 
environment is a proper public order concern because “that is (1) the environment or public realm in 
which young people . . . are educated, (2) the context in which and by which everyone with 
responsibility for the well-being of young people is helped or hindered in assisting them to avoid bad 
forms of life, and (3) the milieu in which and by which all citizens are encouraged and helped, or 
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Comparing a law prohibiting the private use of contraceptives with a 
law regulating abortion helps to illustrate the difference between issues of 
private morality and issues of public order. Finnis argues, for example, that 
the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut134 reached the correct result 
when it struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting the private use of 
contraceptives by spouses.135 Such a law constituted impermissible direct 
supervision of the private consensual conduct of adults. Abortion, however, 
is difficult to characterize as an issue of private morality.136 As then-Justice 
Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Roe v. Wade, the performance of a medical 
abortion by a licensed physician “is not ‘private’ in the ordinary usage of 
that word.”137 More importantly, a court deciding whether abortion is a 
matter of public order must directly confront the fact that abortion involves 
“the killing of a living thing.”138 If that “thing” is a human being,139 then 
abortion clearly is a public order issue that the law properly addresses, 
because it is reasonable to characterize the destruction of human life as a 
violation of public peace, a matter of justice and human rights, and an issue 
of public morality involving the maintenance of a public milieu that 
promotes human flourishing by respecting the dignity of human life.140  
Finnis suggests that a similar distinction should be drawn between laws 
that would recognize same-sex marriages and laws that directly prohibit 
private, adult, consensual same-sex behavior.141 A community can—in 
                                                                                                                                      
discouraged and undermined, in their own resistance to being lured by temptation into falling away 
from their own aspirations to be people of integrated good character, autonomous, and self-controlled 
persons, rather than slaves to the passions.” Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 17. As point 
(3) suggests, safeguarding “public morality” by means of legislation dealing with sexuality extends 
beyond fostering a milieu conducive to assisting parents to raise well-integrated children. Public 
decency laws, for example, are “a related but distinguishable matter, concerned with the maintenance of 
(to be very summary) a certain ‘distance’ from other people’s bodily features and sexuality, a distance 
that most people find essential to maintaining the integration of their own bodily nature and sexuality 
with their self-possession, friendship, etc.” FINNIS, supra note 117, at 229. 
134 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
135 Finnis notes that Griswold was convicted as an accessory to the substantive prohibition of the use of 
contraception by spouses. See Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1076. 
136 Indeed, if the Court had used the distinction between private morality and public order as the basis 
for its decision in Griswold (instead of invoking a more nebulous right to privacy), Griswold would not 
easily have served as the foundation of a line of cases leading to recognition of a fundamental 
constitutional right to make the abortion decision.  
137 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973). 
138 Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 187.  
139 Rubenfeld notes that, even if one concludes that the embryo is not a human being, “we don’t usually 
suppose that law can prevent harms only to human beings. That would be news to anyone who supports 
laws preventing cruelty to animals, not to mention the Endangered Species Act.” Rubenfeld, supra note 
4, at 187. Rubenfeld, however, argues that Roe can be understood as rooted in a principle drawn from 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of legal efforts to recreate the conditions of slavery: “a free 
woman cannot be forced into motherhood against her will.” (More broadly, “no state may force 
particular occupations on individuals, or otherwise instrumentalize them as masters could do to their 
slaves.”). Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 188, 230 n.4. 
140 See Todd David Whitmore, What Would John Courtney Murray Say? On Abortion and Euthanasia, 
121 COMMONWEAL 17, 18 (Oct. 7, 1994). While abortion is a proper subject for law to deal with, what 
the law should be with respect to abortion—especially in a society where there is significant 
disagreement over the morality of abortion—is a distinct question. The public, for example, “may not 
be ready to receive a law that simply mirrors what is morally true.” Id. at 19; see also supra note 95 and 
accompanying text; see also infra note 166 (discussing the prudential and pragmatic limits on good 
law); see also Kaveny, supra note 6, at 350–53 (discussing the practical and moral considerations that 
characterize the making of good law).  
141 See Finnis, Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1050, 1076. 
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accord with the public morality component of public order—use the law to 
regulate the public environment and to structure the social milieu in order 
to encourage the understanding of marriage that it judges to be in accord 
with human flourishing.142 At the same time, respect for the moral limits on 
the law’s power that are reflected in the public order concept, with its 
critical distinction between private morality and public morality, leads 
Finnis to argue that legal coercion should not be used to discourage 
homosexual activity “by way of a law of the type upheld in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.”143 The law in this area should be limited to supervising the 
public realm or environment, not the truly private conduct of adults.144 
D. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The conception of limited, constitutional government that flows from 
the Declaration generates an analytical framework for understanding the 
relationship between human dignity, freedom, morality, and the proper 
functions and limits of law. To synthesize the foregoing terrain, the 
analytical framework is composed of the following six central principles: 
1. Human Dignity Demands Respect for the Exercise of  
Responsible Freedom. 
The right to religious freedom articulated by the Council is rooted in a 
commitment to respect the exercise of responsible freedom that is 
demanded by human dignity. Because the dignity of the human person 
consists in the responsible use of human freedom, individuals and 
associations must possess an ability to seek the truth and act on their own 
judgment, immune from coercion. 
2. Immunity from Coercion in the Exercise of Responsible Freedom is Not 
Dependent on a Person’s Morally Upright Behavior. 
This immunity from coercion is not dependent on whether or not one 
has actually apprehended the truth, and this immunity from coercion must 
                                                                                                                                      
142 See Finnis, Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1050, 1076; see Finnis, 
Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 17. Much of Finnis’s argument relies on his conclusion that 
same-sex sexual activity is immoral. A public order argument in support of traditional marriage law, 
however, need not be rooted in that moral conclusion; see also discussion of Justice Cordy’s dissent 
infra text accompanying notes 221–225.  
143 See Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 17; see also discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986) infra text accompanying notes 151–153.  
144 Finnis, Natural Law Theory, supra note 80, at 17; see Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual 
Orientation,” supra note 80, at 1076 (“The truth and relevance of [the] distinction [between public 
morality and private morality], and its high importance for the common good, would be overlooked . . . 
if laws criminalizing private acts of sodomy between adults were to be struck down by the Court on any 
ground which would also constitutionally require the law to . . . recognize homosexual ‘marriages’ or 
permit the adoption of children by homosexually active people, and so forth.”). See also SAMUEL J.M. 
DONNELLY, A PERSONALIST JURISPRUDENCE, THE NEXT STEP: A PERSON-CENTERED PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 175 (2003) (A right to be let alone, rooted in fundamental 
human dignity, provides the basis for arguing that Bowers was wrongly decided. “In Bowers the 
activities in question took place in the privacy of the home. Public homosexual or heterosexual 
activities or abusive actions were not presented to the Court. Any state or private interests in conflict 
with the right of privacy in this instance would seem to be outweighed by the interest in protecting the 
primary social good of the struggle for moral growth and appropriate relations with others.”).  
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be protected even in those who fail to seek the truth or whose actions do 
not conform to the truth. The human dignity affirmed by the Declaration is 
a dignity shared by every person simply by virtue of his humanity; the 
existence of the human dignity that must be respected in the constitutional 
order is not tied to a person’s morally upright behavior. The fact that 
someone’s deeds might be objectively immoral—or that a governing 
majority in the community might regard the person’s deeds as immoral—
does not strip that person of his inherent human dignity, nor of the right to 
exercise responsible freedom that inherently flows from that dignity. 
3. Respect for the Moral Order Demands Immunity from Legal Coercion 
Unless the Coercive Use of Law Is a Due Restraint Mandated by the 
Just Requirements of Public Order. 
Legal restrictions on a person’s freedom constitute a violation of his 
human dignity unless the coercive restriction is a due restraint mandated by 
the just requirements of public order. To preserve a sphere of autonomy for 
the exercise of responsible freedom, the legitimate scope and power of 
government to act coercively through law must be limited. This immunity 
from coercion is a moral limit on the law’s ability to enforce duties toward 
the truth—a moral limit required by the order of truth of which the dignity 
of the human person is an essential element. To protect responsible 
freedom demanded by human dignity, the law’s role is limited to protecting 
the public order of society. 
4. The State Has a Limited, Subsidiary Role in Promoting the  
Common Good of Society, and the Maintenance of Public  
Order is the Necessary—but Limited—Function that the State 
Legitimately Exercises. 
“Public order” is that limited dimension of the common good of society 
that it is the state’s function to coordinate through law. Every member of 
society—individuals, families, religious groups, voluntary associations, and 
the state—is obliged to promote the common good in an appropriate 
manner. The maintenance of public order is the necessary—but limited—
function that the state legitimately exercises. The concept of public order 
has three essential components, which bear repeating: the effective 
protection of the rights of all citizens and the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts of rights; the adequate protection of that just public peace which is 
to be found where people live together in good order and true justice; and 
the proper guardianship of public morality. If the state attempts to use law 
with respect to matters that go beyond protection of public order—for 
example, if the state attempts to take direct responsibility for shaping the 
moral character of individuals through coercive laws that prohibit private, 
adult, consensual behavior that is thought to be immoral—then the state is 
asserting power that is not justified by its limited subsidiary role in 
promoting the common good. Such ultra vires governmental action injures 
human dignity by invading the sphere reserved for the exercise of 
responsible freedom.  
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5. Care for Public Morality Is an Essential Component of the State’s 
Legitimate Role in Maintaining Public Order. 
The state’s legitimate power to maintain public order properly includes 
the power to supervise public morality, because the preservation of a social 
environment conducive to the pursuit of virtue is a necessary element of the 
common good of society that individuals and voluntary associations cannot 
promote on their own; individuals and groups need the help of the state 
acting through law in order to secure a social milieu or public moral-
cultural-educational environment in which they can pursue their own 
flourishing. 
6. While Care for Public Morality Is a Legitimate State Concern, the 
State’s Limited, Subsidiary Role in Promoting the Common Good 
Prevents the State from Legislating with Respect to Private Morality. 
To distinguish public morality (which is a proper concern of the state) 
from private morality (whose supervision is beyond the limited power of 
the state) is to recognize that not every sin should be a crime; the state’s 
limited subsidiary purpose is not to “make” people wholly virtuous through 
legal coercion. The state does properly act through law, however, to 
regulate behavior which directly affects the core values of public order, 
including the value of preserving a public milieu or environment in which 
all the members of society are able to exercise their responsible freedom 
and pursue human flourishing. 
III. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
The Supreme Court in Lawrence addressed a constitutional challenge 
to a Texas statute “making it a crime for two persons of the same-sex to 
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”145 The Court concluded that 
“the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were 
free as adults to engage in the private [and consensual] conduct 
[criminalized by the statute] in the exercise of their liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.” 
Invoking the line of substantive due process precedents stemming from 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,146 Meyer v. Nebraska,147 and Griswold v. 
Connecticut,148 and culminating in Roe v. Wade149 and Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey,150 the Court struck down the Texas statute 
and explicitly overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers.151 
                                                                                                                                      
145 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
146 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
147 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
148 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
149 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
150 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
151 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 
(2003). “Bowers was not correct when it was decided and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain 
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
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The Court in Bowers had rejected a constitutional challenge to a 
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, holding that the federal constitution 
did not recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 
Absent a fundamental right, the Georgia statute needed only to survive 
rational basis review, and the Bowers Court rejected the argument that “the 
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia . . . is immoral 
and unacceptable” was “an inadequate rationale” in support of the law.152 In 
rejecting the claim that the majority’s “sentiments about the morality of 
homosexuality” should be declared an inadequate basis for the law, the 
Bowers Court advanced the following argument: “The law . . . is constantly 
based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral 
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will 
be very busy indeed.”153 
A. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S OPINION FOR THE COURT 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Lawrence, rejected the 
understanding of the relationship between law and morality embraced by 
the Court in Bowers.154 Instead, the Lawrence Court expressly adopted the 
view advanced by Justice Stevens in his Bowers dissent: “[T]he fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”155 Because Texas advanced no rationale for its 
law apart from its assertion that a governing majority believed the practice 
of same-sex sexual activity to be immoral, the Court concluded that the 
Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter.’ The Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”156 
The Court in Lawrence seems to have seen itself as engaged in the task 
of using the doctrinal tool of substantive due process to consider this 
question: what sorts of legal limits on freedom are consistent with respect 
for human dignity?157 The Court, for example, begins its critique of Bowers 
with the assertion that the Bowers Court—by focusing on the question of 
whether there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sexual 
                                                                                                                                      
Justice O’Connor declined to join in the Court’s substantive due process analysis or in overruling 
Bowers. She did, however, concur in the judgment of the Court on equal protection grounds. 
152 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
153 Id. 
154 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
155 Id. at 558, 560 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
156 Id. at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847) (internal citation omitted). 
157 See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. 
L. REV. 740, 741 (2006) (noting that “human dignity played a prominent role in the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decision-making” in Lawrence). Cf. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights, supra note 7, 
at 101–02 (the inherent dignity of the human person provides the foundation for the morality of human 
rights that is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights).  
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activity—“fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake”158 in the 
case. Statutes like those at issue in Bowers and Lawrence do not simply 
implicate a right to engage in certain sexual conduct; instead, such statutes 
“seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose 
without being punished as criminals.”159 
The Court then argues that, “as a general rule,” legal control of such 
personal relationships is beyond the power of the state, “absent injury to a 
person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”160 This general rule, in 
turn, is rooted in the Court’s acknowledgement that the dignity of free 
persons is protected by the Due Process Clause: 
 
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter 
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.161 
 
The Court recognized that for centuries many people have condemned 
homosexual conduct as immoral on the basis of deeply held moral 
convictions “shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and 
acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.”162 The 
conviction that such conduct is immoral serves for many people as a moral 
principle “to which they aspire and which determine[s] the course of their 
lives.”163 Yet the Court was unwilling to acknowledge such a moral 
principle as a proper basis for a criminal prohibition: 
 
These considerations do not answer the question before us . . . . 
[T]he issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State 
to enforce these views on the whole society through the operation 
of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not mandate our moral code.”164 
 
Bowers adopted a different view of the relationship between law and 
morality, and the Lawrence Court expressly rejected that view. The Court 
explained that Bowers was incorrect on the day that it was decided, in part 
because it failed to acknowledge that developments in “our laws and 
traditions in the past half century . . . . show an emerging awareness that 
                                                                                                                                      
158 Bowers, 539 U.S. at 566–67. 
159 Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (emphasis added). 
162 Id. at 571. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
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liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”165 In support of the 
Court’s conclusion that this emerging awareness should have been apparent 
when Bowers was decided in 1986, Justice Kennedy pointed to four pieces 
of evidence: (1) the American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) 1955 decision not to 
recommend or provide for “criminal penalties for consensual sexual 
relations conducted in private,”166 (2) a history of nonenforcement of 
existing American sodomy laws,167 (3) the 1957 Wolfenden Report 
recommending that the British Parliament repeal laws criminalizing 
homosexual conduct,168 and (4) a 1981 decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,169 holding that laws 
prescribing consensual homosexual conduct were invalid under the 
European Convention on Human Rights.170 
The Court’s reliance on this evidence may create a bridge to the 
understanding of the moral limits on law that I present in this Article. For 
example, the Wolfenden commission based its recommendation on a 
formulation of the proper function of the criminal law which reflects the 
public order principle: the function of the criminal law “is to preserve 
public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or 
injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and 
corruption of others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable.”171 
                                                                                                                                      
165 Id. at 571–72. Cf. Declaration, supra note 10, at 675–77 (a growing consciousness of the dignity of 
the human person and increasing demands for responsible freedom in human society lead to 
development in doctrine). 
166 Bowers, 539 U.S. at 572. The Court noted that the ALI “justified its decision on three grounds: (1) 
The prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct many people engaged in; (2) the 
statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others; and (3) the laws were arbitrarily enforced and 
thus invited the danger of blackmail.” See also MURRAY, supra note 96, at 166–67. The ALI 
justifications for declining to adopt a legal prohibition are strikingly similar to the questions that John 
Courtney Murray, drawing on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, suggests a good lawmaker should ask in 
judging whether or not it would be prudent to adopt a legal ban of a particular moral evil: “[1] Will the 
law be obeyed, at least by the generality? [2] Is it enforceable against the disobedient? [3] Is it prudent 
to . . . enforce[ ] . . . this or that ban, . . . [given] the possibility of harmful effects in other areas of social 
life? (4) Is the instrumentality of a coercive law a good means for the eradication of this or that social 
vice? [5] Since a means is not a good means if it [usually] fails . . . what are the lessons of experience 
[with this sort of ban?] [6] [Moreover, in evaluating our experience,] what is the prudent view of results 
– the long view or the short view?”; see also Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 829 (noting that legal 
moralism tends to backfire; “When lawmakers try [to use the law to teach wisdom or express society’s 
highest ideals], the effort usually backfires. Prohibition did not produce an alcohol free culture, any 
more than contemporary law enforcement crusades have produced a culture that is drug-free. (It seems 
closer to the truth to say that our culture is drug obsessed, perhaps in response to the law’s ceaseless 
efforts to fine-tune what substances Americans can and cannot consume.)”); see also Skeel & Stuntz, 
supra note 29, at 838–39 (discussing the dangers of arbitrary enforcement that often accompany legal 
moralism).  
167 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
168 Id. at 572–73.  
169 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 45 (1981).  
170 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (noting that, because a decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
is “[a]uthoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (twenty-one nations then, 
forty-five nations now), [Dudgeon] is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward 
was insubstantial in our Western civilization”). See FINNIS, supra note 117, at 211–16. A number of 
international human rights documents, including the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, make use of a public order 
limitation on legislative power similar to that outlined in the Declaration on Religious Freedom.  
171 THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND 
PROSTITUTION 23 (1963).  
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The commission further noted that it is not the function of the law to 
restrain the private lives of citizens any further than is necessary to 
accomplish those public order purposes.172 
Moreover, the commission thought it inappropriate to equate the 
“sphere of crime” with that of sin; accordingly, there is “a realm of private 
morality . . . which is . . . not the law’s business.”173 And, in words that 
resonate with the Declaration’s insistence that respect for human dignity 
demands protection of a realm of responsible freedom, the Wolfenden 
commission explained that private morality lies beyond the legitimate reach 
of the law in order to “emphasize the personal and private responsibility of 
the individual for his own actions . . . a responsibility which a mature agent 
can properly be expected to carry for himself without the threat of 
punishment from the law.”174  
The Lawrence Court went on to argue that the holding of Bowers had 
been undermined by its post-Bowers decisions in Casey and Romer v. 
Evans.175 Justice Kennedy drew from Casey a connection between the 
personal dignity and autonomy that are both central to the liberty protected 
by the Due Process Clause. The Court’s substantive due process 
                                                                                                                                      
172 THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 171, at 23–24. The distinction the Report makes between 
public order and decency may reflect the more limited common law understanding of public order noted 
by John Finnis. See FINNIS, supra note 117, at 215. By including the protection of decency within the 
proper function of the criminal law, the Wolfenden Report seems to adopt a functional understanding of 
the public order principle that resembles the way in which the concept of public order is used in this 
Article and in the Declaration on Religious Freedom.  
173 THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 171, at 48. Cf. MURRAY, supra note 91 at 157–58; Skeel & 
Stuntz, supra note 29, at 839–40. This recognition of a sphere of private morality that the law has no 
legitimate business regulating is not foreign to the U.S. constitutional tradition. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1886) 
(“The police power of the government cannot be brought into operation for the purpose of exacting 
obedience to the rules of morality, and banishing vice and sin from the world. The moral laws can exact 
obedience only in foro conscientiae.”); see also id. at 4–5 (“Any law which . . . undertakes . . . to limit 
the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and general security, 
cannot be included in the police power of government. It is a governmental usurpation, and violates the 
principles of abstract justice, as they have been developed under our republican institutions.”). Suzanne 
Goldberg notes that “Bowers stands alone in its endorsement and acceptance of a pure morals-based 
justification for lawmaking,” and she demonstrates that, apart from Bowers, the Supreme Court’s post-
World War II jurisprudence has looked for “observable social harms” as the basis for sustaining 
governmental action. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1254, 1259; see also Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1259–
61 (discussing Tiedeman’s understanding of the scope of the police power). What Goldberg 
characterizes as “observable social harms,” fall within the sphere of public order concerns that I argue it 
is the law’s legitimate business to regulate. The distinction between a private realm that lies beyond the 
government’s regulatory power and threats to public order that the law can properly address is also 
reflected in the Court’s distinction between the private possession of obscene material and the 
legitimate regulation of the commercial distribution of obscene material. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (states’ broad power to regulate obscenity “simply does not extend to mere 
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home”), with United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 
139, 143 (1973) (“Government has a legitimate interest in protecting the public commercial 
environment by preventing such material from entering the stream of commerce.”), id. at 142–43 (“[A] 
myriad of activities may be lawfully conducted within the privacy and confines of the home, but may be 
prohibited in public.”), and United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting argument that Lawrence undermines Orito; federal statutes regulating commercial 
distribution of obscenity do not violate any constitutional right to privacy), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2048 
(2006). Cf. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1268–33 (discussing the Court’s recognition that concern about 
public secondary effects of adult entertainment provide a legitimate basis for regulation). 
174 THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 171, at 48. 
175 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
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jurisprudence holds that the Constitution demands respect for the autonomy 
of the human person in making personal decisions regarding marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and 
education: 
 
“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under the compulsion of the State.” Persons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual 
persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.176 
 
There is without a doubt much that can be criticized in this passage. 
For example, is the heart of liberty the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the meaning of human 
life?177 Or, is liberty—the responsible freedom demanded by human 
dignity—more properly understood as the right to seek the truth about 
existence, meaning, the universe, and the mystery of human life free of 
compulsion of the state?178 And what does it mean to “seek autonomy” in 
order to make choices that define one’s beliefs about the meaning of the 
universe free of state compulsion in this context? Isn’t the due process 
question in Lawrence more properly framed as whether the state has an 
adequate basis for limiting the autonomy that is demanded by human 
dignity by depriving someone of their liberty (i.e., coercively restraining 
their conduct—no one is being compelled to believe anything here) simply 
because a governing majority is convinced that the conduct is immoral? 
Questions like these suggest that the Lawrence Court has failed coherently 
to articulate the relationship between human dignity, freedom, morality, and 
law. Yet the passage does indicate that properly articulating the demands of 
that relationship is at the heart of substantive due process analysis. 
The Court then turns to Romer, where the Court struck down, as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that deprived persons who are homosexual the ability to seek 
protection under state antidiscrimination laws.179 The Court in Romer 
concluded that the Colorado constitutional provision was “ ‘born of 
                                                                                                                                      
176 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
177 See, e.g., id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he dictum of [Casey’s] famed sweet-mystery-of-life 
passage . . . ‘casts some doubt’ upon either the totality of our jurisprudence or else (presumably the right 
answer) nothing at all. I have never heard of a law that attempted to restrict one’s ‘right to define’ 
certain concepts; and if the passage calls into question the government’s power to regulate actions 
based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of existence, etc.,’ it is the passage that ate the rule of law.”); 
RUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 185 (describing the “grand vapidity” of Casey’s mystery-of-life passage) 
(“The language quoted is so magniloquent that it is virtually contentless – any action could fall within 
the ‘right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe.’  ”).  
178 Cf. Declaration, supra note 10, at 679–81; see also supra text accompanying notes 42–58. 
179 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
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animosity toward the class of persons affected’ ” and “had no rational 
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.”180 Rather than simply 
relying on Romer, however, to strike down the Texas statute as a provision 
“born of animosity” toward homosexuals and therefore lacking a rational 
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose, Justice Kennedy concluded 
that the Court must squarely address the continuing validity of Bowers 
itself. 
The Court explained that failure to address the central holding of 
Bowers might suggest that a sodomy statute drawn to criminalize the 
conduct between both same-sex and different-sex participants would be 
substantively valid. Even if such a statute could not be enforced against 
homosexual conduct alone without violating the equal protection clause, a 
law declaring homosexual conduct to be a criminal offense “in and of itself 
is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the 
public and in the private spheres.”181 Thus, leaving Bowers in place as a 
valid precedent “demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”182 Moreover 
the stigma imposed by the offense defined in Texas’ criminal statute is not 
trivial.183 Even though it is a minor offense (a class C misdemeanor), “it 
remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the 
persons charged.”184  
While the Court’s rejection of Bowers declared that “the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice 
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice,”185 the Court did not go on to state what more might be required to 
satisfy the Constitution. The Court, however, did emphasize what this case 
did not involve: 
 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who 
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or 
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons may seek to 
enter.186 
 
Although the Court does not use this language, it appears that the 
Court’s conclusion rests on the absence of any factors that would implicate 
“public order” concerns. This case would be different if it involved injury 
to minors or coerced, non-consensual conduct. In such cases, the law can 
properly intervene in the name of protecting public order: the effective 
safeguarding of the rights of all citizens to be free from injury. 
                                                                                                                                      
180 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
181 Id. at 575. 
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 577. 
186 Id. at 578. 
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This case would also be different if it involved public sexual conduct, 
prostitution, or formal legal recognition of homosexual relationships. Each 
of these cases can be characterized as implicating the public morality 
component of public order—society’s right to invoke the law to supervise 
the public social environment in order to secure a moral-cultural-
educational milieu conducive to human flourishing. Lawrence, in contrast, 
involves the state’s improper attempt to use legal coercion to address an 
issue of private morality. The Texas criminal prohibition of private, adult, 
consensual same-sex sexual activity constitutes an effort to “make” 
individuals virtuous—it is not an effort to regulate behavior affecting the 
public social milieu—and, thus it is “an abuse of public power, ultra vires 
because directed to an end which state government and law do not truly 
have[.]”187 
Absent any “public order” justification, the Texas law cannot survive 
rational basis scrutiny because it furthers no legitimate state interest: 
 
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the government . . . . The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal 
and private life of the individual.188 
 
Thus, while the Court did not characterize its holding explicitly in these 
terms, the Court’s holding, along with the limitations the Court placed on 
that holding, can be read together to support the following proposition: the 
“substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause”189 bars the state 
from criminalizing or prohibiting conduct without some “public order” 
justification. 
Such a conclusion is consistent with the analytical framework 
elaborated in the Declaration—human dignity demands that the coercive 
power of the state only be used to restrain freedom when the limitation 
serves a “public order” function related to the state’s limited role in 
promoting the common good.190 Acknowledging that a state interest only 
                                                                                                                                      
187 FINNIS, supra note 76, at 239. See supra, text accompanying notes 85–90. 
188 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
189 Id. at 564. 
190 There is an interesting resonance between the concluding sentences of Justice Kennedy’s opinion and 
the Declaration’s acknowledgment that it is drawing new implications out of the foundational truth of 
human dignity. Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (“[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment . . . did not presume to have this insight [into 
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities]. They knew that times can blind us to certain 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.”) with Declaration, supra note 10, at 676 (recognizing that new demands 
are being made for responsible freedom in human society and that constitutional limits be set to the 
powers of government. “This Vatican Synod takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men. It 
proposes to declare them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice. To this end, it searches into the 
sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church – the treasury out of which the Church continually brings 
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becomes “legitimate” for purposes of rational basis review when that 
interest constitutes a public order concern thus serves to explain both the 
Court’s holding in Lawrence and the limits that it wishes to place on that 
holding.  
B. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S CONCURRENCE 
Although Justice O’Connor did not join Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court overruling Bowers, her opinion concurring in the judgment on 
equal protection grounds also attempts to analyze the relationship between 
morality and law in the context of rational basis review. Drawing on the 
line of equal protection cases that culminated in the Court’s decision in 
Romer, Justice O’Connor explained that the Court has “consistently held . . 
. that some objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state interests.”191 While Texas argued 
that its statute served the legitimate, Bowers-endorsed, state interest of 
promoting morality, Justice O’Connor chose to read Bowers quite 
narrowly: Bowers’ morality rationale might insulate a law criminalizing 
sodomy from a substantive due process challenge, but “Bowers did not 
hold that moral disapproval of a group is a rational basis under the Equal 
Protection Clause to criminalize homosexual sodomy when heterosexual 
sodomy is not punished.”192 
Lawrence, in contrast, directly presented the equal protection issue of 
whether moral disapproval by itself is a legitimate state interest justifying a 
statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. In 
Justice O’Connor’s view, moral disapproval alone was not a legitimate 
interest justifying such a statutory distinction: 
 
Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an 
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, 
without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the 
Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups 
of persons.193 
 
Moral disapproval of a group fails as a legitimate state interest, because 
“legal classifications must not be drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging 
the group burdened by the law.”194 
                                                                                                                                      
forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.”). The notion of development of 
doctrine is at work in both the Declaration and Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lawrence. 
See also Kalscheur, supra note 26, at 126–28. 
191 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). See also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 
(1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
192 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582. 
193 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
194 Id. at 583. 
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The Texas statute targets only conduct that is closely correlated with 
being homosexual and is rarely enforced in the context of private, 
consensual acts; thus Justice O’Connor concludes that the Texas statute 
serves as an animus-driven statement of dislike and disapproval “directed 
toward gay persons as a class,”195 and “the State cannot single out one 
identifiable class of citizens for punishment that does not apply to everyone 
else, with moral disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law.” 
But what else besides moral disapproval is necessary to provide a 
legitimate state interest supporting a criminal prohibition? Presumably a 
state’s criminal prohibition of robbery reflects animosity toward, and moral 
disapproval of robbers, and is targeted against a class defined by the 
conduct that defines the class.196 What then, separates Texas’ 
criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct from its criminalization of 
robbery?197 The threat to “public order” posed by robbery, but absent in the 
case, of private, consensual sexual conduct like that at issue in Lawrence, 
would seem to fill the gap.  
Justice O’Connor seems to gesture toward a similar sort of public order 
argument when she contends that the invalidity of Texas’ statute as applied 
to private, consensual conduct “does not mean that other laws 
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail 
rational basis review.”198 Such a distinction in the context of national 
security or traditional marriage law might well be supported by a legitimate 
state interest beyond moral disapproval. “Unlike the moral disapproval of 
same-sex relations – the asserted state interest in this case – other reasons 
exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond the mere moral 
disapproval of an excluded group.”199 Justice O’Connor does not make 
those “other reasons” explicit, but public order moral reasons would 
provide a principled basis for the distinction she seeks to draw.200 
C. JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT 
Justice Scalia’s Lawrence dissent rejects the rational-basis analyses of 
both Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor. He contends that the Texas 
statute should be upheld on the basis of the “ancient proposition” holding 
“that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral 
                                                                                                                                      
195 Id.  
196 Cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (noting that “criminal punishment usually 
represents the moral condemnation of the community”).  
197 Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600–01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting Justice O’Connor’s critique of 
the Texas same-sex sodomy statute on the ground that it targets conduct defining a class: “Of course the 
same could be said of any law. A law against public nudity targets ‘the conduct that is closely correlated 
with being a nudist,’ and hence ‘is targeted at more than conduct’; it is ‘directed toward nudists as a 
class.’ ”). It should be noted, that a public nudity prohibition would have a public order purpose—the 
maintenance of public morality: a social “milieu in which children can be brought up (and parents 
assisted rather than hindered in bringing them up) so that they are relatively free from inward subjection 
to an egoistic, impulsive, or depersonalized sexuality.” FINNIS, supra note 117, at 217. 
198 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585. 
199 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
200 See discussion of marriage and public order, infra text accompanying notes 220–239. 
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and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”201 Indeed, 
Justice Scalia fears that rejection of that “ancient proposition” leads the 
Court to engage in “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will 
have far reaching implications beyond this case.”202 He argues that, by 
rejecting Bowers and its affirmation of majoritarian moral disapproval as a 
legitimate state interest providing a rational basis for legislation, the Court 
has effectively decreed an end to all morals legislation203 and left on “pretty 
shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”204 
Justice Scalia claims that all morals legislation is at risk, because it is 
impossible to distinguish the now unconstitutional prohibition of same-sex 
sexual conduct from laws against “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and 
obscenity.”205 All such laws are “sustainable only in light of Bowers’ 
validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws 
is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to 
cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.”206  
For Justice Scalia, the logical implications of Lawrence are clear. The 
Court’s effort to distinguish the criminal prohibition of same-sex sexual 
activity from the legal recognition of same-sex unions is a “bald, 
unreasoned disclaimer” that should not be believed: 
 
Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has 
permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual 
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral 
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate state interest’ for 
purposes of proscribing that conduct, . . . what justification could there 
possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples 
exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution”? Surely not the 
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed 
to marry. This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage 
only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do 
with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court 
comfortingly assures us, this is so. 207 
 
For Justice Scalia, it seems that the only principled way for 
constitutional law to avoid this head-on collision with traditional marriage 
                                                                                                                                      
201 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. at 586. 
203 Id. at 599. 
204 Id. at 601. 
205 Id. at 590. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 604–05. See also id. at 601–02 (“Justice O’Connor seeks to preserve [laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples] by the conclusory statement that ‘preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage’ is a legitimate state interest. But ‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is just a 
kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples. . . . In the jurisprudence 
Justice O’Connor has seemingly created, judges can validate laws by characterizing them as ‘preserving 
the traditions of society’ (good); or invalidate them by characterizing them as ‘expressing moral 
disapproval’ (bad).”).  
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law is to affirm the propriety of legal regulation of the entire field of 
morality, unless some specific constitutional protection prevents the state 
from acting. Perhaps the clearest statement of Justice Scalia’s 
understanding of the scope of the law’s legitimate role in regulating 
morality is to be found in his concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatres,208 where the Court, without a majority opinion, upheld 
enforcement of an Indiana public indecency statute. Scalia there offered the 
following argument rejecting the contention that offense to others ought to 
be the only reason for prohibiting public nudity: 
 
Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain 
activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, in 
the traditional phrase, “contra bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. In American 
society, such prohibitions have included, for example, sadomasochism, 
cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and sodomy. While 
there may be a great diversity of views on whether various of these 
prohibitions should exist (though I have found few ready to abandon, in 
principle, all of them), there is no doubt that, absent specific constitutional 
protection for the conduct involved, the Constitution does not prohibit 
them simply because they regulate “morality” . . . The purpose of the 
Indiana statute, as both its text and the manner of its enforcement 
demonstrate, is to enforce the traditional moral belief that people should 
not expose their private parts indiscriminately, regardless of whether those 
who see them are disedified.209 
 
The state under Justice Scalia’s view thus has the power to prohibit 
conduct, absent specific constitutional protection of such conduct, simply 
because it is immoral—against good morals. Understood in this way, 
Justice Scalia’s view serves as an example of the ethical or moral view of 
the state rejected in the Declaration on Religious Liberty. Bowers and 
Barnes are representative for Justice Scalia of “[c]ountless judicial 
decisions and legislative enactments [that] have relied on this ancient 
proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is 
‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”210 
Justice Scalia warns that to depart from this “ancient proposition,” 
which he believes is the only ground for morals legislation or traditional 
marriage law, is to invite “a massive disruption of the current social 
order.”211 Yet, the public order concept would serve to save society from 
much of the massive disruption that Justice Scalia fears, while at the same 
time helping us to understand Lawrence as a proper exercise of rational-
basis review. If we were to conclude that the freedom demanded by human 
dignity should not be restricted unless the state can offer a public order 
                                                                                                                                      
208 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).  
209 Id. at 575. 
210 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
211 Id. at 591. 
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justification in support of the restriction the implications feared by Justice 
Scalia need not be so far reaching. 
IV. PUTTING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC ORDER TO WORK 
Many of the legal prohibitions that Justice Scalia describes as 
traditional morals offenses can be easily understood as offenses against 
public order. As such, the state, with its limited subsidiary role in 
promoting the common good, has a legitimate interest in prohibiting them. 
For example, the ordinance at issue in Barnes can be understood as dealing 
with a public order concern, namely, public morality. Indiscriminate public 
display of one’s private parts properly is prohibited by law not simply 
because a governing majority believes such conduct to be immoral, but 
because that conduct constitutes a particular sort of moral problem—a 
problem of public morality. Such conduct is destructive of a public moral-
cultural-educational environment in which all can flourish; it is therefore a 
public order concern, providing a legitimate basis for government to act 
through law.212 
Similarly, in the course of rejecting Lawrence-based challenges to laws 
criminalizing prostitution, courts have identified a variety of legitimate 
state interests that justify laws against prostitution: the prevention of 
communicable disease, prevention of sexual exploitation, reducing 
prostitution-related crimes of violence and theft, and protecting the 
integrity and stability of family life.213 While crime and sexual exploitation 
are easily seen as public order concerns, as threats to one’s right to be free 
from harm, the whole ensemble of interests identified as justifying 
prohibitions of prostitution might be aptly characterized as public morality 
concerns. 214 Whether framed in terms of crime prevention or public 
morality, these interests fall within the category of public order concerns. 
Justice Scalia is right to predict that not all traditional morals laws will 
survive Lawrence. For example, the Court’s holding in Lawrence did lead 
the Virginia Supreme Court to recognize the constitutional invalidity of the 
state’s criminalization of fornication. Virginia law provided that “[a]ny 
person, not being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse 
with any other person shall be guilty of fornication.”215 In Martin v. 
Ziherl,216 this statute was invoked by Kristopher Ziherl, an unmarried 
partner in a sexually active relationship, as a defense to a tort claim 
alleging that he had knowingly infected Muguet Martin with the sexually 
transmitted herpes virus while they were engaged in unprotected sexual 
                                                                                                                                      
212 See supra text accompanying notes 117–133.  
213 State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); see, e.g., State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 
1237 (La. 2005) (“ ‘no protected privacy interest in public, commercial sexual conduct’ ”); People v. 
Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (The commercial sale of sex is excluded from the 
Lawrence analysis; statute reflects the distinction between private, noncommercial acts and the business 
of selling sex). 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 117–133. 
215 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–344 (2004), invalidated by Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).  
216 Martin, 607 S.E.2d 367. 
KALSCHEUR.DOC 11/28/2006  10:25:41 AM 
2006] Moral Limits on Morals Legislation 43 
 
conduct. Ziherl asserted that Martin could not recover damages because her 
injuries were caused by her participation in an illegal act, i.e., violation of 
the statutory prohibition of fornication.217 
The Virginia court rejected Ziherl’s argument, explaining that it could 
“find no relevant distinction between the circumstances in Lawrence” and 
the circumstances in the case before it. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the 
private, consensual adult behavior in the context of a relationship at issue in 
Martin could remain illegal in the wake of Lawrence.218 Yet, the court in 
Martin was careful to place limits on its holding: “Our holding, like that of 
the Supreme Court in Lawrence, addresses only private, consensual 
conduct between adults and the respective statutes’ impact on such conduct. 
Our holding does not affect the Commonwealth’s police power regarding 
regulation of public fornication, prostitution, or other such crimes.”219 
Thus, the state’s ability to act in order to regulate behavior posing a more 
direct threat to core public order concerns remains undisturbed. It would 
seem clear that, so long as the state can act through law in order to promote 
the state’s moral interest in protecting public order, the dire social 
consequences feared by Justice Scalia are unlikely to be realized. 
In particular, Justice Scalia’s assertion that there is no principled way in 
which to avoid a head-on collision between Lawrence and traditional 
marriage law is mistaken. The concept of public order provides the 
principled distinction that was not articulated in Lawrence itself. The 
questions of what the institution of civil marriage means, how it should be 
structured, and to whom it should be open are not questions of private 
morality—they are public questions of the highest importance.220 Nor are 
all arguments supporting the maintenance of traditional marriage law 
properly understood as manifesting moral disapproval of same-sex sexual 
conduct or animus toward homosexuals. 
                                                                                                                                      
217 Id. at 368. 
218 Id. at 370. “We find no principled way to conclude that the specific act of intercourse is not an 
element of a personal relationship between two unmarried persons or that the Virginia statute 
criminalizing intercourse between unmarried persons does not improperly abridge a personal 
relationship that is within the liberty interest of persons to choose.” See also Hobbs v. Smith, 2006 WL 
3103008 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006) (invalidating North Carolina’s prohibition of unmarried 
cohabitation on the ground that the statute “violates plaintiff’s substantive due process right to liberty as 
explained in Lawrence”). 
219 Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 371; see also Tjan v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 669, 672 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) 
(no substantive due process protection for sexual behavior in a public restroom in a department store; 
prohibition of “public sexual conduct does not implicate the more narrow liberty interest upheld in 
Lawrence); Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (same). Cf. Sonia K. 
Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: the Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 14 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J., 1429, 1435 (2006) (noting that the post-Lawrence case law often reads Lawrence to reflect 
“an implicit logic of containment that has relegated the exercise of sexual autonomy to private, rather 
than public, spaces . . . .”).  
220 See also Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: 
Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution 
Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 921 (2006) (“[M]arriage is readily characterized as a ‘public’ act and 
accordingly could be argued to lie outside Lawrence’s holding.”); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742–43 
(Utah 2006) (rejecting a Lawrence-based challenge to Utah’s prohibition of bigamy; the case falls 
outside the scope of the holding in Lawrence because marriage is a public institution protected by law). 
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Justice Cordy’s dissenting opinion in Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. 
Health,221 for example, articulates a clear public order argument 
demonstrating a rational basis for traditional marriage law.222 Justice Cordy 
explains that the traditional structure of civil marriage—one man and one 
woman committed for life—“reflects society’s judgment as how optimally 
to manage procreation and the resultant child rearing.”223 This judgment is 
based on centuries of experience with the institution of civil marriage; it is 
reflected in consistent judicial acknowledgement of the institutional 
importance of marriage as an organizing principle of society;224 and a range 
of studies support the conclusion that a family environment with married 
opposite-sex parents remains the optimal social structure in which to bear 
children.225 
Few would disagree with Justice Cordy that ensuring, promoting, and 
supporting an optimal social structure for the bearing and raising of 
children is a valid exercise of the state’s police power.226 Moreover, it 
should be clear that this exercise of the police power is not being invoked 
to address an issue of private morality. Instead, civil marriage law promotes 
a central moral purpose involving public order: supporting a social 
structure in which children can flourish and take their place in society.227 
                                                                                                                                      
221 Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (state lacks rational basis for 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage); see also id. at 995–1005 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the purposes of the institution of civil marriage and the rational basis for excluding same-sex couples 
from civil marriage). 
222 See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (N.Y. 2006) (The New York Court of Appeals drew on 
Justice Cordy’s dissent in holding that New York’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
survived rational basis review); see also Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) 
(limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interests in 
procreation and encouraging families with a mother and father and children biologically related to 
both). Cf. Posting of Dale Carpenter, to The Volokh Conspiracy,  
http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_20006_07_09-2006_07_15.shtml#1152628917 (July 11, 
2006, 10:41) (copy on file with author) (“It would be surprising if [existing marriage laws] couldn’t 
satisfy [rational basis review], notwithstanding the conclusion of the majority of the Massachusetts high 
court in Goodridge. In fact, the best example of the application of rational basis to uphold the exclusion 
of gays from marriage is still Justice Cordy’s dissent in that case. His opinion is at once respectful of 
homosexuals’ claims, temperate in tone, closely reasoned, and a model of the kind of judicial humility 
associated with the [rational basis] test.”). 
223 Goodrich, 798 N.E.2d at 1002 n.34 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
224 Id. at 996. 
225 Id. at 999–1000; see also id. at 995–99 (Justice Cordy citing a range of historical and social science 
material);. See also Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, What About the Children? Liberal Cautions 
on Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET AND MORALS 29, 50 
(Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006) (noting that marriage is classically defined as “a 
public institution that integrates sexual desire and affection into the heavy-duty tasks of generativity and 
kin-based intergenerational child care”); see also id. at 43, 46 (the majority in Goodridge “defines 
marriage as primarily a ‘private,’ ‘intimate,’ ‘committed,’ and ‘exclusive’ union that is ‘among life’s 
momentous acts of self-definition’ ” . . . while “brush[ing] aside the now-large body of social science 
data which indicates that children raised by their married biological parents do better, on average, than 
those raised by single parents or stepparents[.]” . . . “[O]ur society’s experience with . . . alternative 
family forms [other than same-sex couples] suggests that these families will not, on average, be able to 
reduplicate the investments and consolidations of marriage built on the energies of kin altruism, the 
consolidation of which has been in the past the primary goal of marriage.”). 
226 See Goodrich, 798 N.E.2d. at 983. 
227 Id. at 996 (“The marital family is also the foremost setting for the education and socialization of 
children. Children learn about the world and their place in it primarily from those who raise them, and 
those children eventually grow up to exert some influence, great or small, positive or negative, on 
society. The institution of marriage encourages parents to remain committed to each other and to their 
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Indeed, society’s care for “what contributes to human flourishing by 
meeting the unique needs of the individuals in question,” i.e., children, can 
be characterized as a question of justice.228 This then, is the central 
question: is there a rational basis on which the legislature can conclude that 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage furthers the 
undeniably legitimate purpose of ensuring, promoting, and supporting the 
optimal social structure for the bearing and raising of children?229 
Justice Cordy offers two reasons why a legislature could rationally 
conclude that the traditional understanding of civil marriage should not be 
altered to include same-sex couples. First, taking into account all of the 
information now available, the legislature could rationally conclude that  
 
[t]he raising of children by same-sex couples, who by definition cannot be 
the two sole biological parents of a child and cannot provide children with 
a parental authority figure of each gender, presents an alternative structure 
for child rearing that has not yet proved itself beyond reasonable scientific 
dispute to be as optimal as the biologically based marriage norm. Working 
from the assumption that recognition of same-sex marriages will increase 
the number of children experiencing this alternative, the Legislature could 
conceivably conclude that declining to recognize same-sex marriages 
remains prudent until empirical questions about its impact on the 
upbringing of children are resolved.230 
 
Second, Justice Cordy argued that redefining the institution of marriage 
to include same-sex couples would undermine the state’s interest in 
promoting and supporting heterosexual marriage as the social institution 
that best integrates procreation and child rearing. In other words, the legal 
redefinition of civil marriage will send a new and different message to 
people about why society believes marriage to be important and what its 
social purpose is: 
 
[A]s long as marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples who can at least 
theoretically procreate, society is able to communicate a consistent 
message to its citizens that marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of 
their procreative endeavor; that if they are to procreate, then society has 
endorsed the institution of marriage as the environment for it and for the 
subsequent rearing of their children; and that benefits are available 
explicitly to create a supportive and conducive atmosphere for those 
purposes. If society proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between 
                                                                                                                                      
children as they grow, thereby encouraging a stable venue for the education and socialization of 
children.”).  
228 See Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 45 (“Dismissing [the] core relation between kin 
altruism and marriage constitutes the ultimate injustice to children.”); Browning & Marquardt, supra 
note 225, at 46 (“To disregard the needs of children, the traditions that have understood these needs, and 
contemporary social science evidence offends natural justice.”); Browning & Marquardt, supra note 
225, at 47 (“[T]he legalization of same-sex marriage is . . . unjust to children.”). 
229 Goodrich, 798 N.E.2d at 998 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 1000 (internal citations omitted). 
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same-sex couples who cannot procreate, it could be perceived as an 
abandonment of this claim, and might result in the mistaken view that 
civil marriage has little to do with procreation[;] just as the potential of 
procreation would not be necessary for a marriage to be valid, marriage 
would not be necessary for optimal procreation and child rearing to occur. 
In essence, the Legislature could conclude that the consequence of such a 
policy shift would be a diminution of society’s ability to steer the acts of 
procreation and child rearing into their most optimal setting.231 
 
Thus, Justice Cordy concludes, a rational legislature “could at least harbor 
rational concerns about possible unintended consequences of a dramatic 
redefinition of marriage,”232 and thus a structure of civil marriage law that 
does not extend to same-sex couples is rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose.233 
The legitimacy of this state purpose does not lie in its moral 
neutrality.234 Neither the traditional definition of marriage, nor the 
definition of marriage adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Goodridge, is morally neutral. Proponents of the traditional 
definition of marriage, which strives to place generativity at the center of 
marriage by integrating sexual behavior, birth, and child rearing by natural 
parents, so that children are raised, “as nearly as possible, by the parents 
who conceive them,”235 are making a moral argument about how society 
should be ordered to best promote human flourishing, especially the 
flourishing of children. 
In contrast, the redefinition of marriage adopted by the court in 
Goodridge makes “the exclusive and permanent commitment of the 
                                                                                                                                      
231 Id. at 1002 (internal citations omitted). 
232 Id. at 1003. See also Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 45 (“[I]t is the classic intentionality 
of [marriage] law that the Goodridge majority rejects – the intention to guide and channel the 
integration of this list of goods [sex, love, dependency, childbirth, and childrearing] as nearly as 
possible.”); Browning and Marquardt argue that Goodridge’s “redefinition of marriage raises to the 
level of public policy the rejection of the historic relation between marriage and kin altruism. It 
dispenses with the principle that the individuals who give life to children should be the ones who raise 
them in a bonded and enduring relation. We believe that the reasons implicit in this tradition . . . pass 
the rationality standard requested by the Judicial Supreme Court of Massachusetts.” Browning & 
Marquardt, supra note 225, at 45. 
233 Under rationality review, the overinclusiveness of traditional marriage law is not constitutionally 
fatal. “Although the marriage statute is overinclusive because it comprehends within its scope infertile 
[or voluntarily nonreproductive opposite-sex couples], this overinclusiveness does not make the statute 
constitutionally infirm. The overinclusiveness present here is constitutionally permissible because the 
Commonwealth has chosen, reasonably, not to test every prospective married couple for fertility and not 
to demand of fertile prospective married couples whether or not they will procreate. It is satisfied, 
rather, to allow every couple whose biological opposition makes procreation theoretically possible to 
join the institution.” Goodrich, 798 N.E.2d at 1002–03 n.35 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 44–45 (questioning the capacity of 
opposite-sex couples to have children is not necessary; “In the name of privacy, the law rightfully does 
not pry[.]”). 
234 Cf. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Toward a Thomistic Perpsective on Abortion and the Law in Contemporary 
America, 55 THE THOMIST 343, 370–71 (1991) (“[T]he aim of liberals to achieve a value-neutral stance 
above or beyond competing conceptions of the good life is unrealistic. . . . Liberal individualism does in 
fact choose certain goods over others, and so does a society which conceives of abortion as a private 
matter of individual choice.”). 
235 Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 46. 
KALSCHEUR.DOC 11/28/2006  10:25:41 AM 
2006] Moral Limits on Morals Legislation 47 
 
marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, . . . the sine 
qua non of civil marriage.”236 Yet this redefinition of marriage is no less 
rooted in morality than the traditional definition. The redefinition, which 
“make[s] sexual exchange, affection, and mutual dependency the center of 
[marriage] with its generative goals secondary, incidental, [or] even 
ignored,”237 is simply rooted in a different normative vision of what sort of 
social ordering will best promote human flourishing and protect human 
dignity. 
My objective in this Article is not to advocate which of these views of 
human flourishing should form the basis of civil marriage law. There are 
serious and important arguments on both sides of that question. My point is 
simply to emphasize that the arguments on both sides of the question are 
moral arguments. And they are arguments about an area of morality that the 
law should properly deal with, because the institution of marriage 
implicates public order concerns, understood either in terms of justice (i.e., 
the child’s right to be raised in an optimal social setting)238 or in terms of 
public morality (i.e., the question of how law should structure the public 
environment in which children are raised to best promote the flourishing of 
all). 
Thus, the public order concept does provide a principled way to head 
off the constitutional collision between Lawrence and traditional marriage 
law that Justice Scalia fears. The public order concept would explain the 
care taken by Justice Kennedy to make clear what Lawrence was not about. 
Justice Cordy similarly ended his Goodridge dissent by emphasizing what 
the case was not about; it was not about a government intrusion into a 
matter of person liberty, or the rights of same-sex couples to live together 
or be intimate with each other. Instead, Goodridge raised a much different 
question—must the state endorse the choices made by same-sex couples 
“by changing the institution of civil marriage to makes its benefits, 
obligations, and responsibilities applicable to them”?239 This is a public 
order question, not a question of private morality. 
The public order concept articulates the principle that drives the 
distinctions being made by both Justice Kennedy and Justice Cordy, and 
thus provides the principle that Justice Scalia fears is lacking in 
Lawrence—civil marriage is a public order issue and is, therefore, a proper 
subject for law. Private, adult, consensual same-sex sexual conduct within 
the context of a relationship does not directly affect the public order, and 
                                                                                                                                      
236 Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 43 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (majority 
opinion)). 
237 Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 45. 
238 See Browning & Marquardt, supra note 225, at 45 (Children “have the right to expect to be raised in 
a society whose legal and cultural institutions attempt to maximize the possibility that they will be 
raised by the parents who conceived them.”). 
239 Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1004–05 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
See also id. at 978 (Spina, J., dissenting) (Lawrence and Griswold “focus on the threat to privacy when 
government seeks to regulate the most intimate activity behind bedroom doors. The statute in question 
does not seek to regulate intimate activity within an intimate relationship, but merely gives formal 
recognition to a particular marriage. The State has respected the private lives of the plaintiffs, and has 
done nothing to intrude in the relationships that each of the plaintiff couples enjoy.”).  
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thus falls within a sphere of responsible freedom that lies beyond the 
legitimate reach of law.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The law is constantly based on notions of morality. The Bowers Court 
was right about that.240 Human rights, justice, equality, and due process are 
all moral concepts—they are norms and principles that protect human 
dignity and promote human flourishing. But the law does not properly deal 
with the whole of morality. The Lawrence Court correctly recognized that 
limitation, but failed to articulate a principle for distinguishing between 
moral purposes that are properly pursued through law, and moral issues that 
lie beyond the proper reach of the law. Instead, the Court generated 
confusion by speaking as though moral purposes are never a legitimate 
ground for state action. 
There was no need for the Lawrence Court to suggest that moral 
disapproval has no legitimate place in the law. A principled explanation of 
both the Lawrence holding and its limitations is found in the moral concept 
of public order. The Court could clarify the confusion regarding the 
relationship between law and morality manifest in the various opinions in 
Lawrence if it were to acknowledge explicitly that a state interest only 
becomes legitimate for purposes of rational basis review when the asserted 
interest constitutes a public order concern. The question of whether or not a 
law legitimately serves a public order concern or illegitimately regulates 
private morality may sometimes be difficult to answer.241 But it has the 
virtue of being the proper question over which to fight. A constitutional 
jurisprudence that aspires to be faithful to the sort of limited, constitutional 
government that is demanded by respect for human dignity should 
recognize that the coercive power of the state may only be used to restrain 
human freedom when that limitation serves a public order function related 
to the state’s limited, subsidiary role in promoting the common good. The 
analytical framework that this Article draws from the Declaration on 
Religious Freedom can contribute useful insights to this jurisprudence.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
240 See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 1300–01, 1301 n.280. 
241 See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 76, at 254 n.e (simply invoking the words “public” and “private” can be 
“unhelpfully circular”; the analytical focus must be on whether a given issue implicates the rationale 
which justifies the state’s use of legal coercion or falls outside the limits of that rationale); Mark D. 
Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 199–206 (2004) (while the distinction between 
public and private can be contested, maintaining the distinction reflects deeply held American cultural 
values that favor protecting autonomy). 
